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Does Majority Voting Improve Board
Accountability?
Stephen J. Choit
Jill E. Fischtt
Marcel Kahant
Edward B. Rocktt
Directors have traditionally been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. This
means that in uncontested elections, a candidate who receives even a single vote is
elected. Proponents of shareholder democracy have advocated a shift to a majority
voting rule, in which a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast to be
elected. Over the past decade, they have been successful, and the shift to majority
voting has been one of the most popular and successful governance reforms.
Yet critics are skeptical as to whether majority voting improves board account-
ability. Tellingly, directors of companies with majority voting rarely fail to receive
majority approval-even more rarely than directors of companies with plurality vot-
ing. Even when such directors fail to receive majority approval, they are unlikely to
be forced to leave the board. This poses a puzzle: Why do firms switch to majority
voting, and what effect, if any, does the switch have on director behavior?
We empirically examine the adoption and impact of a majority voting rule us-
ing a sample of uncontested irector elections from 2007 to 2013. We test and find
partial support for four hypotheses that could explain why directors of majority vot-
ing firms so rarely fail to receive majority support: selection, deterrence or account-
ability, electioneering by firms, and restraint by shareholders.
Our results further suggest that the reasons for and effects of adopting majority
voting may differ between early and late adopters. We find that early adopters of
majority voting were more shareholder responsive than other firms, even before they
adopted majority voting. These firms seem to have adopted majority voting volun-
tarily, and the adoption of majority voting has made little difference in their respon-
siveness to shareholders going forward. By contrast, for late adopters we find no
evidence that they were more shareholder esponsive than other firms before they
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adopted majority voting, but we find strong evidence that they became more respon-
sive after adopting majority voting.
Differences between early and late adopters can have important implications
for understanding the spread of corporate governance r forms and evaluating their
effects on firms. Rather than targeting the firms that, by their measures, are most in
need of reform, reform advocates instead seem to have targeted the firms that were
already the most responsive. These advocates may then have used the widespread
adoption of majority voting to create pressure on the nonadopting firms to conform.
Empirical studies of the effects of governance changes thus need to be sensitive to the
possibility that early adopters and late adopters of reforms differ from each other
and that the reforms may have different effects on these two groups of firms.
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INTRODUCTION
Directors have long been elected by a plurality of the votes
cast.1 In uncontested elections, this means that a candidate who
1 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 216 ("In the absence of such specification in
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation ... [d]irectors shall be elected
by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the
meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors."); Model Bus Corp Act § 7.28(a)
(2011) ("Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, directors are elected by
a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election at a meeting at
which a quorum is present."). Prior to 1987, Delaware law required the affirmative vote of
a majority of the shares present for the election of directors. See 8 Del Code Ann § 216 (1983).
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receives even a single vote is elected.2 Because most director elec-
tions are uncontested,3 proponents of shareholder democracy
have long decried the traditional plurality voting rule (PVR).4 In-
stead, they favor a majority voting rule (MVR) according to which
a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast to be elected.)
Over the last decade, the move from plurality to majority vot-
ing for corporate directors has been one of the most popular and
successful corporate governance reform efforts.6 As recently as
2005, only nine of the S&P 100 companies used majority voting in
director elections.7 The shift since then has been dramatic. As of
January 2014, almost 90 percent of S&P 500 companies have
adopted some form of majority voting.8
Advocates of majority voting argue that it is a critical tool for
maintaining director accountability to shareholders. In the words
of the Council for Institutional Investors, "[m]ajority voting en-
sures that shareowners' votes count and makes directors more ac-
countable to the shareowners they represent."9 Accepting this
premise, the Toronto Stock Exchange recently amended its com-
pany manual to require majority voting for listed companies.1o
2 State law governs the power of shareholders to nominate director candidates. Jill
E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 Vand L Rev 1129,
1144 (1993). Our analysis focuses exclusively on uncontested elections.
3 See Lee Harris, Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elec-
tions, 2010 Colum Bus L Rev 104, 120-21 (reporting that, over the time period from 1999
to 2008, the average number of contested elections at public companies was about thirty-
six per year).
4 See, for example, Jeff Mahoney, General Counsel of the Council of Institutional
Investors, Letter to John Carey, Vice President of Legal for NYSE Regulation, Inc *4 (June
20, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/X4PT-PKJW (terming the plurality voting process
as "antiquated, or as some have described 'truly bizarre'").
5 Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and David Oesch, Does the Director Election Sys-
tem Matter? Evidence from Majority Voting, 20 Rev Accounting Stud 1, 2 (2015).
6 See Bo Becker and Guhan Subramanian, Improving Director Elections, 3 Harv Bus
L Rev 1, 10 (2013) (describing a "rapid proliferation of majority vote requirements among
U.S. companies").
7 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex L Rev 987, 1011 (2010).
8 Marc S. Gerber, US Corporate Governance: Boards of Directors Face Increased
Scrutiny, in Thomas H. Kennedy, et al, eds, 2014Insights *157, 157 (Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP), archived at http://perma.cc/SKC3-HXCE.
9 Majority Voting for Directors (Council of Institutional Investors, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/5MNV-P9JE.
10 Toronto Stock Exchange Mandates Majority Voting to Further Enhance Corporate
Governance (TMX Group, Feb 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8XPC-PTUX (an-
nouncing the adoption of a "majority voting' requirement that may be satisfied by a policy
requiring a director to tender a resignation if the director receives more "withhold" than
"for" votes). The Council for Institutional Investors has petitioned the NYSE and NASDAQ
to do the same. See Majority Voting for Directors (cited in note 9).
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Yet critics of majority voting are skeptical. One recent article
argues that majority voting "is little more than smoke and mir-
rors."11 Another characterizes majority voting as a "paper tiger.12
A striking finding from our data is that under plurality voting,
the likelihood that a director fails to receive a majority "for" vote
is nineteen times higher than under majority voting (0.622 per-
cent versus 0.033 percent).13 Of over twenty-four thousand direc-
tor nominees at S&P 1500 companies who were subject to an
MVR in elections between 2007 and 2013, only eight failed to re-
ceive a majority of "for" votes.14 Even when a director fails to re-
ceive a majority, that director might not actually leave the board.
Rather, such a director stays on until the director resigns, the di-
rector is removed, or a successor is elected.15 In fact, in our sam-
ple, of the eight directors at M'VR firms who failed to receive a
majority, only three actually left the board following the election.16
These findings raise two related issues. First, what accounts
for the different voting patterns under PVRs and MVRs? Second,
given that the direct effect of majority voting is negligible-a
shareholder power to remove directors that is exercised at the
11 William K. Sjostrom Jr and Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors, 40 Conn L Rev 459, 487, 489 (2007) (conducting an event study and finding "no
statistically significant market reaction" to a company's adoption of majority voting).
12 Jay Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner, and Ralph A. Walkling, A Paper Tiger? An Empir-
ical Analysis of Majority Voting, 21 J Corp Fin 119, 120 (2013) (finding that the "adoption
of majority voting has little effect on director votes, director turnover, or improvement of
firm performance").
13 See Part II.
14 See Part III.A.
15 Majority voting provisions typically require a director who fails to receive a major-
ity to tender his or her resignation, but the board need not accept that resignation. It is
not unusual for a board to refuse to accept the director's proffered resignation. See Jeff
Green, America's Teflon Corporate Boards (Bloomberg, July 14, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/GJC3-ZGQ8. The limited effectiveness of the shareholder vote was power-
fully illustrated at the May 2011 annual meeting of IRIS International (an issuer not in
our sample), at which none of the nine director candidates received a majority of votes in
favor. The directors then submitted their resignations, and the board voted not to accept
them. Bloomberg has described boards that fail to remove an outvoted director as "Teflon
Corporate Boards." Id.
16 A separate study of Russell 3000 majority voting firms also found that directors
who failed to receive a majority vote were only sometimes removed. For a more detailed
examination of five of these cases, see Becker and Subramanian, 3 Harv Bus L Rev at 13-
14 (cited in note 6) (reporting that boards accepted resignations of only two of five such
directors and one such acceptance was because of a state mandate). See also Kimberly
Gladman, Agnes Grunfeld, and Michelle Lamb, The Election of Corporate Directors:
What Happens When Shareowners Withhold a Majority of Votes from Director Nomi-
nees? *2 (IRRC Institute, Aug 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/R6AW-B8ZL (reporting
that "[o]nly 5% of the majority withhold votes in our study [of 175 director nominees
from Russell 3000 firms] led directly to director removal").
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rate of one in eight thousand is hardly worth mentioning-does
majority voting have more significant indirect effects on board ac-
countability? That is, does the possibility that a nominee may fail
to get a majority of "for" votes, and thereby face an increased risk
of losing his or her board seat, encourage directors to be more re-
sponsive to shareholder interests?
At first blush, it may appear that majority voting could gen-
erate substantial indirect effects and that the reason directors
fare better under majority voting is because they are more respon-
sive to shareholders. As we detail below,' directors who are sub-
ject to majority voting are more likely to attend board meetings
regularly and less likely to receive a "withhold" recommendation
from Institutional Shareholder Services, Incis (ISS) than directors
who are subject to plurality voting.
There are, however, alternative explanations for these differ-
ences. For example, causality may run in the other direction:
Companies that are more responsive to shareholders may be more
likely to adopt majority voting, and majority voting may have no
effect on director actions. Or companies subject to majority voting
may lobby ISS more heavily to avert a "withhold" recommendation.
In this Article, we empirically examine the different impacts
of an MVR using a sample of uncontested director elections from
2007 to 2013. The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we offer
a brief background on the shift to a majority voting standard
among large publicly traded issuers. In Part II, we describe in
more detail four hypotheses that could explain the discrepancy
between the likelihood that a director candidate will fail to get a
majority of "for" votes under the different voting rules. We then
proceed to test the hypotheses. In Part III, we describe the data
set, the tests we performed, and the results.
While we find some support for all four hypotheses, our most
dramatic results indicate differences between early and late
adopters with respect to the adoption and effect of majority voting.
Specifically, we find strong evidence of selection effects for early
adopters; firms that adopted majority voting early had more suc-
cess in director elections and more shareholder-oriented corporate
governance prior to the adoption. In contrast, we find the adoption
17 See Parts III.B.3-4.
18 Institutional Shareholder Services is the dominant proxy advisory firm. See Stephen
J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, and Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors,
82 S Cal L Rev 649, 651-52 (2009) (describing the role and influence of ISS and other proxy
advisors).
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of majority voting by late adopters led to more shareholder-friendly
governance. These findings suggest that investors, perhaps
counterintuitively, may have employed a strategy of targeting
shareholder-responsive firms first, rather than focusing on
those companies most in need of governance reform.
As far as we know, this is the first time that this difference
has been established empirically. As we discuss in more detail be-
low, this difference, especially if generalizable to the adoption of
other corporate governance reforms, has broad implications. In
particular, empirical studies of the adoption and effect of govern-
ance reform should be sensitive to potential differences between
early and late adopters. These differences also suggest that early
evaluations of a particular reform may understate the effect of the
reform to the extent that the reform has not yet spread to those
firms most likely to be affected by its adoption. Our study high-
lights the importance of considering these differences in future
research analyzing other reforms, such as proxy access, bylaws
enabling shareholders to request special meetings, and the sepa-
ration of positions of chair and CEO.
I. THE SHIFT FROM PLURALITY TO MAJORITY VOTING
Traditionally, directors in most companies were elected by a
plurality of the votes cast.19 This plurality standard was (and re-
mains) the default rule in Delaware and most other states.20 A
problem with the traditional plurality standard is that it has little
meaning in an uncontested election, which most board elections
are.21 If the number of nominees to the board is equal to the num-
ber of board seats to be filled, every nominee who receives at least
one vote will be elected. As a result, even a nominee who has min-
imal support among shareholders is assured of getting on the
19 See note 1.
20 See 8 Del Code Ann § 216. Very few states provide for a non-PVR default. See Ala
Code Ann § IOA-2-7.28; Alaska Stat Ann § 10.06.415; 805 ILCS 5/7.60; Mo Ann Stat
§ 351.265 (providing that an MVR is the default for corporations that do not have cumu-
lative voting); ND Cent Code § 10-35-09 (same); NM Stat Ann § 53-11-32; SD Cod Laws
§§ 47-1A-725, -728. See also Mary Siegel, The Holes in Majority Voting, 2011 Colum Bus
L Rev 364, 369 & n 18 ("Only five states, however, provide majority voting as the default
rule.").
21 See Harris, Missing in Activism, 2010 Colum Bus L Rev at 120-21 (cited in note 3).
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board.22 Similarly, in the absence of a competing nominee, dis-
gruntled shareholders cannot unseat a director by failing to vote
in favor of his or her election.23
Shareholder inability to cast an effective vote against direc-
tor candidates has not prevented shareholders from expressing
their dissatisfaction with director nominees. In 1993, Professor
Joseph Grundfest published an article urging investors to engage
in symbolic "vote no" campaigns to express concerns about an is-
suer's performance.24 Institutional investors began to engage in
"withhold"-vote campaigns.25 One highly publicized example was
the effort led by the California Public Employees' Retirement
System (CalPERS) to "withhold" votes at Disney from director
nominee Michael Eisner.26 The effort was enhanced by the grow-
ing influence of proxy advisory firms such as ISS,27 which offer
institutional investors recommendations on which director nom-
inees to target with "withhold" votes.28
Beginning in 2005, shareholder activists began to push for
changes in the voting standard.29 Initially, some issuers adopted
22 As officers and directors virtually always hold at least some stock, the election of
the issuer's nominees in an uncontested election with a PVR is a virtual certainty. See, for
example, Trends in Board of Director Compensation (Harvard Law School Forum on Cor-
porate Governance and Financial Regulation, Apr 13, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/M5VZ-BLRL (noting that "companies typically provide [ equity awards
and require minimum stock ownership" of directors).
23 See Joann S. Lublin, Directors Lose Elections, but Not Seats (Wall St J, Sept 28,
2009), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125409320578444429 (visited July 9,
2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (reporting that ninety-three board members at fifty
issuers received less than a majority of votes cast during 2009, but that none lost a board
seat because they all served at issuers with plurality voting).
24 See generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Deal-
ing with Barbarians inside the Gates, 45 Stan L Rev 857 (1993).
25 See Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery, and Tracie Woidtke, Do Boards Pay Attention
When Institutional Investor Activists "Just Vote No"?, 90 J Fin Econ 84, 85 (2008) (studying
112 publicly announced "just vote no" campaigns sponsored by institutional investors be-
tween 1990 and 2003).
26 See Bruce Orwall, Calpers to Withhold Voting for Eisner (Wall St J, Feb 26, 2004),
online at http://www.wsj.comlarticles/SB107774511301139206 (visited Dec 5, 2015)
(Perma archive unavailable).
27 See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors:
Myth or Reality?, 59 Emory L J 869, 870-71 (2010) (describing the services provided by
proxy advisors).
28 See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual
Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 Harv Bus L Rev 35, 39 (2013). For further analysis on
the role and influence of proxy advisors, see generally Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and
David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J Ac-
counting Rsrch 951 (2013).
29 The Carpenter Pension Funds appear to have introduced the first shareholder pro-
posals seeking an MVR. The Funds submitted twelve such proposals during the 2004
1126 The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1119
a director-resignation policy-a board policy requiring each board
nominee to submit a conditional offer to resign if he or she does
not receive a majority of the votes cast at the next election.30 Later
on, issuers amended their bylaws or charters to adopt a majority
standard for uncontested director elections. Under the strict ma-
jority standard, a nominee is elected only if he or she receives
more "for" votes than "against" votes.8 1
Even under a strict majority standard, in which a nominee is
not elected if he or she does not get a majority of "for" votes, a
failure to be elected does not automatically mean that the nomi-
nee will be removed from the board.32 Under the laws of Delaware
and many other states, an incumbent director continues as a hold-
over director until the director resigns, the director is removed, or
a successor is elected.33 Thus, even if an incumbent director fails
to secure a majority of "for" votes, the director often stays in office,
at least for the time being. In addition, statutes generally provide,
at least as a default matter, that the board of directors has the
authority to fill vacancies on the board.34 As a legal matter, noth-
ing prevents the board from appointing the very person who failed
to receive a majority of "for" votes to fill the vacancy.
proxy season. See Douglas J. McCarron, President of the United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters and Joiners of America, Letter to Brent J. Fields, Secretary of the SEC *3 n 11 (Mar
10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KJB9-FSFY (describing the history of the Carpenter
Funds' use of MVR proposals). The MVR movement gained visibility when reporter Louis
Lavelle published a January 2005 article in BusinessWeek. See Louis Lavelle, A Simple
Way to Make Boards Behave, BusinessWeek 38 (Jan 31, 2005).
30 See Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 21 J Corp Fin at 120-21 (cited in note 12) (describ-
ing and distinguishing director-resignation policies from "true majority" mechanisms).
31 Notably, even the strictest standard requires only that a director candidate receive
a majority of votes cast. In contrast, some corporate issues, such as approval of a merger,
require an affirmative vote by a majority of outstanding shares. See, for example, 8 Del
Code Ann § 251(c).
Note also that there is a distinction between "against" and "withhold" votes. Under
an MVR, shareholders who oppose election can vote "against"; under a PVR, shareholders
who oppose election can only "withhold" their vote. See generally Securities and Exchange
Commission, Release No 34-16356: Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participa-
tion in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, 44 Fed Reg
68764, 68765 (1979), amending various sections of CFR Title 17. Because this Article com-
pares MVR and PVR companies, we often use the terms interchangeably.
32 Siegel, 2011 Colum Bus L Rev 364, 374-80 (cited in note 20).
33 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 141(b). See also Siegel, 2011 Colum Bus L Rev
at 375-78 (cited in note 20) (discussing various states' "holdover rule" statutory schemes).
But see Model Bus Corp Act §§ 8.05, 10.22 (2011) (providing an abbreviated holdover pe-
riod of ninety days for directors who are not reelected in a company that has adopted ma-
jority voting).
34 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 223.
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MVRs have been embraced by both investors and issuers.35
As a result, the movement from plurality to majority voting has
been relatively rapid, especially at large companies. Some type of
MVR was used by approximately 16 percent of S&P 500 compa-
nies in February 2006.36 As of January 2014, approximately 90
percent of S&P 500 companies used some form of majority vot-
ing.37 The shift to majority voting at smaller companies has been
less pronounced. As of 2012, 52 percent of mid-cap companies had
adopted majority voting.38 The percentage of small-cap companies
with majority voting as of 2012 was far lower-only 19 percent.3 9
Many commentators have argued that majority voting en-
hances director accountability to shareholders. In 2005, then-ISS
Vice President Stephen Deane wrote that majority voting "holds
the potential to enable a new era in constructive dialogue between
corporations and their owners."40 The Council of Institutional In-
vestors supported the adoption of majority voting and urged the
NYSE and NASDAQ to impose a majority voting requirement as a
listing standard.4' Professor Lucian Bebchuk wrote that "given the
clear and widely accepted flaws of plurality voting, majority voting
should be the default arrangement.42 Professor Lisa Fairfax ar-
gued that "[t]o the extent the threat of losing a board seat impacts
board behavior, majority voting increases shareholders' ability to
influence board behavior.43
35 See, for example, Stephen Deane, Majority Voting in Director Elections: From the
Symbolic to the Democratic *6 (ISS, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/ZT4W-3DCV (de-
scribing initiatives by both investors and issuers seeking to implement majority voting);
Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, Preliminary Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws on Voting by Shareholders
for the Election of Directors *21-26 (Jan 17, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/FHC7-CC3T
(proposing an enabling approach to majority voting).
36 Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections *i (Neal, Gerber
& Eisenberg LLP, Nov 12, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/X4JH-LZM7.
37 Gerber, Boards of Directors Face Increased Scrutiny at *157 (cited in note 8).
38 Governance Trends and Practices at US Companies: A Review of Small- and Mid-
sized Companies *10 (Ernst & Young, May 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5ZYF-9EDZ
("From 2007 to 2012, the proportion of small-cap companies with majority voting provi-
sions in director elections has grown from 7% to 19% and the proportion of mid-cap com-
panies has jumped dramatically from 18% to 52%.").
39 Id.
40 Deane, Majority Voting in Director Elections at *1 (cited in note 35).
41 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 BU
L Rev 1997, 2010 (2014).
42 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va L Rev 675,
702 (2007).
43 Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U Ill L Rev
821, 826 (2013).
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Few studies have examined the effect of majority voting em-
pirically. An early study by Professors William Sjostrom and
Young Sang Kim looked at stock price reactions to firms' adoptions
of majority voting and found no statistically significant market re-
actions.44 The study suggested that the lack of impact was due, in
part, to the fact that majority voting does not in fact "give[ ] share-
holders veto power over incumbent directors.4-5 Rather, the au-
thors concluded, M1VRs were "smoke and mirrors" because the
board ultimately had the power to retain a losing director.46
Professors Jie Cai, Jacqueline Garner, and Ralph Walkling
looked at 481 firms that adopted majority voting from 2004 to
2007. 47 Their study found that early adopters initially experienced
positive abnormal returns in response to the adoption announce-
ment.48 The study found that, over a one-year time period, how-
ever, the "adoption of majority voting has little effect on director
votes, director turnover, or improvement of firm performance.49
Importantly, although poorly performing firms were more likely
to adopt an MVR, their performance continued to deteriorate af-
ter the adoption of majority voting.50 The authors therefore con-
cluded that majority voting was a "paper tiger."51
Finally, Professors Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and David
Oesch looked at shareholder proposals on majority voting.52 Using
a regression-discontinuity design, they showed that the adoption
of these proposals is associated with a positive abnormal stock
price return.53 Moreover, using a matched sample (based on pro-
pensity scores), they found that firms that have adopted majority
voting are more likely to implement shareholder proposals54 and
less likely to experience high levels of "withhold" votes for direc-
tors in consecutive annual meetings.65
44 See Sjostrom and Kim, 40 Conn L Rev at 489-90 (cited in note 11). The study
looked at 116 firms that adopted or announced that they would adopt majority voting be-
tween September 2004 and October 2006. Id.
45 Id at 486.
46 Idat 487.
47 Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 21 J Corp Fin at 123 (cited in note 12).
48 Id at 129-30.
49 Id at 120.
50 Id at 131-32.
51 Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 21 J Corp Fin at 133 (cited in note 12).
52 See generally Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch, 20 Rev Accounting Stud 1 (cited in
note 5).
53 Id at 6-16.
54 Id at 17-27.
55 Id at 27-32.
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This Article contributes to this literature by distinguishing
among, and empirically examining, several possible explanations
for the differential voting patterns observed between firms that
employ plurality voting and those that employ majority voting.
Moreover, this Article is the first to differentiate early adopters of
majority voting from late adopters and to present evidence that
factors explaining the voting patterns differ significantly for these
two sets of firms.
II. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT VOTING
PATTERNS
Elections governed by an MVR exhibit a strikingly different
vote pattern from elections governed by a PVR. As noted above,
directors elected under an MVR are far more likely to receive a
majority "for" vote. In our sample, which consists of almost sixty-
five thousand uncontested director elections at S&P 1500 compa-
nies between 2007 and 2013, only 0.033 percent of director nomi-
nees in elections governed by an MVR failed to receive a majority
of votes cast. By contrast, in elections governed by a PVR, 0.622
percent of candidates failed to garner a majority. The difference
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the fraction of direc-
tors that failed to receive a majority "for" vote. We also report the
summary statistics for subsets of our sample divided according to
market capitalization.
Several hypotheses may account for the difference in voting
patterns between MVR and PVR firms. Companies that adopt
majority voting may simply be different from companies that do
not. This is a standard selection effect-"good" companies self-
select into adopting majority voting.56 Ex post, nominees at these
companies are less likely to receive a high "withhold" vote, but this
effect is not caused by majority voting but rather by the underlying
good-governance factors that led the company to adopt majority
voting. We refer to this explanation as the selection hypothesis.
Alternatively, the different voting patterns may be caused by
the difference in voting rules. We refer to this explanation as the
causation hypothesis. In particular, there are three different ways
56 We put "good" in quotation marks because good merely connotes a lower ex ante
likelihood of having a nominee receive a high "withhold" vote. This does not suggest that
it is always or even generally best for companies and directors to avoid taking actions that
cause high "withhold" votes. We could equally well describe this as "shareholder respon-
sive" or, as we will see, "ISS compliant."
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in which the voting rules may cause differential voting patterns,
each with different normative implications. The first possibility,
that an MVR increases director accountability by making direc-
tors more responsive to shareholder interests, is what has driven
investors to support the implementation of majority voting.57 We
refer to this form of the causation hypothesis as the deterrence (or
accountability) hypothesis. Notably, confirming the deterrence
hypothesis does not necessarily demonstrate that directors who
are subject to majority voting are making better decisions. Cater-
ing to shareholders may not lead to increased firm value.58 Indeed,
skeptics might describe the deterrence effect as making directors
more responsive to ISS, given the reputed influence of ISS over
shareholder voting decisions.59 To avoid the implication that an
MVR induces superior decisions, we use the term "shareholder
friendly" or "shareholder responsive" governance to refer to ac-
tions that have a lower likelihood of inducing "withhold" votes.
A second possibility is that companies that have adopted ma-
jority voting may engage in more campaigning in close elections
because the implications of receiving a majority "withhold" vote
are more severe. Relatedly, these companies may lobby ISS
harder not to issue a "withhold" recommendation. We refer to this
form of the causation hypothesis as the electioneering hypothesis.
ISS has a practice of notifying S&P 500 companies that it in-
tends to issue a "withhold" recommendation and offering them a
forty-eight-hour window during which they can engage with ISS
about the recommendation.o It is commonplace for issuers to en-
gage with ISS, both during this window and otherwise, in an at-
tempt to influence ISS's recommendations.61 Upon receiving such
a warning, MVR companies may make greater efforts to persuade
57 See, for example, Mahoney, Letter to John Carey at *4 (cited in note 4), quoting
U.S. Financial Regulatory Reform: The Investors' Perspective *22 (Investors' Working
Group, July 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/QU9D-NDFV (explaining that "[p]lurality
voting in uncontested situations results in 'rubber stamp' elections").
58 Compare generally William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, The Case against
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U Pa L Rev 653 (2010), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv L Rev 833 (2005).
59 See Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 59 Emory L J at 871-72 (cited in note 27) (recounting
various estimates of ISS's influence on shareholder voting).
60 Holly J. Gregory, How to Address ISS & Glass Lewis Policy Changes (Harvard
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Jan 17, 2013),
archived at http://perma.ccMC9B-N9ZA.
61 See Ning Chiu, Conversation with ISS about Issuer Engagement with ISS (Davis
Polk & Wardwell LLP, Mar 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7SVC-ZS7R (reporting
on an interview with Marc Goldstein, head of issuer engagement at ISS).
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS: FRACTION OF DIRECTORS WHO
FAILED TO RECEIVE A MAJORITY "FOR" VOTE
Standard
Plurality Majority Difference Error
Full Sample 0.00622 0.00033 0.0059** 0.0014
Firms with Market 0.01143 0.00000 0.0114+  0.0065
Capitalization
< $1 Billion
Firms with Market 0.00460 0.00026 0.0043* 0.0017
Capitalization
> $1 Billion and:< $10
Billion
Firms with Market 0.00350 0.00041 0.0031* 0.0016
Capitalization
> $10 Billion
Note: The $1 billion cutoff corresponds approximately to the twenty-fifth
percentile for market capitalization of the sample firms. The $10 billion cutoff
corresponds approximately to the seventy-fifth percentile for market
capitalization of the sample firms. The Difference column reports the difference
between the Plurality and Majority columns. The Standard Error column
reports the standard error of the difference, clustered at the company level. For
an example of a comparison of director characteristics using the standard error
clustered at the company level, see Vyacheslav Fos and Margarita Tsoutsoura,
Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J
Fin Econ 316, 322 (2014). The Difference column also reports the statistical
significance of the difference as follows: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
ISS not to issue that recommendation than PVR companies do.
Because a positive ISS recommendation virtually guarantees that
the election will not be close,62 persuading ISS not to issue a neg-
ative recommendation is an effective strategy to guarantee a ma-
jority "for" vote.
In addition to lobbying ISS, companies can address share-
holders directly. Companies can communicate individually with
larger institutional investors to explain why a nominee should be
elected and the value of the nominee to the company. They might
also hint that the company would not look favorably on any insti-
tution that votes against the nominee or that the company would
be less inclined to answer questions by investment professionals
62 See text accompanying note 104.
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who work for such an institution. Companies can also communi-
cate publicly with shareholders through formal proxy solicitation
materials. Companies can engage the services of a proxy solicita-
tion firm to communicate with shareholders, and can increase the
efforts exerted by such a firm in the case of a close election. All
these solicitation efforts entail costs, but when the consequences
of failing to get a majority of "for" votes are more severe, as they
are under an MVR, companies may be more willing to incur these
costs.
Notably, companies know when an election is likely to be
close. Indeed, they have detailed information about the prelimi-
nary voting tallies well before the shareholders meeting. Histori-
cally, Broadridge Financial Solutions, the firm that runs the me-
chanics of proxy solicitation and vote tabulation,63 has provided
interim voting information to issuers from the date that the proxy
materials are distributed to investors up through the date of the
shareholders meeting.4 This information enables companies to
predict the outcome of the vote and to shape their shareholder-
engagement policies accordingly.65
Finally, shareholders may be more reluctant to cast a vote
against a nominee when a failure to get a majority of "for" votes
could result in the ouster of the nominee. Shareholders may view
casting a "withhold" vote under a PVR as a symbolic protest vote.
Indeed, when Professor Grundfest first popularized "vote no"
campaigns as a way to deal with legal developments that reduced
the effectiveness of the market for corporate control as a form of
discipline, he explicitly extolled the value of such campaigns as a
symbolic gesture rather than a tool with a meaningful potential
63 See Eleanor Bloxham, The Secret Power Player behind Almost All Shareholder
Votes (Fortune, Feb 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Z2PB-MCSJ (describing the
work of Broadridge).
64 See Recommendations of the Investor Advisory Committee: Impartiality in the Dis-
closure of Preliminary Voting Results *2-3 (Oct 9, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZHA3-HNSB (describing Broadridge's "real-time" provision of "prelimi-
nary proxy results" to issuers in the days leading up to the meeting); Proxy Vote Reporting
and "Interim Vote Status Information" *2 (Broadridge, Apr 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/KNTR4-LHNE (explaining Broadridge's policies for providing interim vot-
ing information).
65 See Karlee Weinmann, Broadridge Calls Off Controversial Proxy Vote Reforms
(Law360, Feb 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/2W86-HDES (explaining that the pro-
vision of interim voting information enables participants in an election "to predict the
likely outcome, understand voter trends and shape their shareholder outreach efforts
around them").
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for changing board composition.66 In contrast, shareholders may
be concerned that a failure to elect a full slate of directors at a
company with an MVR may interfere with board functioning and
therefore may be reluctant to cast "no" votes. Similarly, Profes-
sors Cai, Garner, and Walkling suggest that institutional inves-
tors may fear that such a failure would adversely affect stock
price and, as a result, may be more reluctant to vote against a
director in a majority voting firm. 67 We refer to this form of the
causation hypothesis as the shareholder-restraint hypothesis.
In an earlier article, two of us analyzed the consequences of
majority "withhold" votes at companies using a PVR.68 In exam-
ining Russell 3000 companies in the 2008 and 2009 proxy sea-
sons, we found that only 3 of 112 director nominees who failed to
receive a majority vote under a PVR left the board, at least imme-
diately-a much lower percentage than our results here for nom-
inees at companies using an MVR.69 However, for about two-
thirds of the other nominees, the company and the director took
steps that effectively addressed the underlying reason for the
high "withhold" vote.70 We concluded that "withhold" votes at
companies with plurality voting were effective in inducing com-
panies and directors to change their behavior (though not in in-
ducing a change in board composition).
Moreover, because most shareholders seem satisfied if com-
panies and directors change their behavior-as judged by the low
percentage of "withhold" votes received in subsequent elections
by nominees who took corrective measures but remained on the
board-we conjectured that the main aim of "withhold" votes at
66 See Grundfest, 45 Stan L Rev at 865 (cited in note 24) ("The effect of a 'just vote
no' campaign is thus purely symbolic: It will not oust incumbent directors or executives,
nor will it upset the corporation's formal governance structure.").
67 See Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 21 J Corp Fin at 122 (cited in note 12). In an earlier
article, these authors found that firms with majority voting receive higher director-approval
rates than firms with plurality voting. See Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner, and Ralph A.
Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J Fin 2389, 2401 (2009).
68 See Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 Va L
Rev 1347, 1420-25 (2011).
69 Id at 1420. The sample included 1 director who lost an election under an MVR,
making the total number of director nominees who left the board immediately after failing
to receive a majority vote 4 out of 113. Id.
70 Id at 1421. This estimate is based on the responses of companies with "nominees
who did not leave the board within one year and whose companies were not acquired or
about to be acquired by the next annual meeting (98 nominees)." Id.
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these companies was to induce changes in behavior and not nec-
essarily to oust nominees from their board seats.71 For a share-
holder who wants to induce a change in behavior but not a turn-
over in board composition, the voting decision under a plurality
regime is an easy one. The voting decision under an MVR is more
complicated. If a director or nominee faces a real risk of not re-
ceiving a majority of "for" votes, a decision to vote "against" may
overshoot by inducing the director to leave the board. Under a
majority regime, such a shareholder may therefore decide to cast
a "for" vote (or abstain from voting) when, under a plurality reg-
ime, the shareholder would have voted against a nominee.
The four explanations we have discussed-the selection, deter-
rence or accountability, electioneering, and shareholder-restraint
hypotheses-are not mutually exclusive. Each explanation may
contribute to some extent to the difference in voting patterns.
Moreover, different explanations may apply to different groups of
firms. As noted above, majority voting has swept through the
largest firms and has become increasingly common in smaller
publicly traded companies. It is possible that majority voting, and
perhaps corporate governance reforms more generally, will be
adopted first by firms that are already very responsive to share-
holders and thus can adopt the reform at very low cost-a selec-
tion effect. At some point, however, a reform may become accepted
as a best practice, and later adopters may feel compelled to adopt
the reform and become more responsive as a result-a causal ef-
fect. It is thus plausible that companies with shareholder-friendly
governance adopted majority voting relatively early, but that
companies that adopted majority voting later on do not differ
much from nonadopters. Alternatively, it may also be plausible
that reform advocates first pressured those companies with the
least shareholder-friendly governance-those most in need of gov-
ernance changes-to adopt majority voting.72 In the next Part, we
describe various tests directed at examining the importance of
each of these explanations for the sample as a whole and for dif-
ferent subsets of companies.
71 Id at 1423-24.
72 Institutional investor CalPERS has a long-established practice of targeting under-
performing firms with efforts at inducing corporate governance reform. See, for example,
Mark Anson, Ted White, and Ho Ho, The Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS' Focus
List, 15 J App Corp Fin 102, 104-05 (Spring 2003) (examining the effectiveness of
CalPERS's governance program).
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Data Description
We collected data on shareholder voting in director elections
at S&P 1500 companies for the years 2007 through 2013. Our
data set consists of 64,933 elections, with about 9,000 observa-
tions per year. We obtained voting data on director elections at
S&P 1500 companies from ISS. We started with 65,751 observa-
tions of uncontested director elections in the data set. We dropped
those observations in which the vote requirement was either un-
known or not majority or plurality voting for the election of direc-
tors, leaving 65,690 observations. We then dropped observations
involving entities other than corporations (such as real estate in-
vestment trusts), leaving 64,933 observations.
Our data include the votes cast "for" and "withhold" (or
"against")73 on each nominee, whether the election was governed
by an MVR or a PVR, and the recommendation issued by ISS. We
also collected information on several director and company char-
acteristics that our past research has identified as associated with
the vote outcome.74 We obtained executive compensation data
from ExecuComp, stock return data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP), board composition and director biog-
raphy data from RiskMetrics Group, institutional investor hold-
ings data from Thomson Reuters, restatement data from Audit
Analytics, issue-proposal outcome data from Georgeson, and
state-of-incorporation data from Compustat. We also collected
certain corporate governance data-including whether the com-
pany had an active poison pill, a classified board, or cumulative
voting in the year of the election-from RiskMetrics. A descrip-
tion of the variables is in the Appendix.
For the data set as a whole, 37.3 percent of the elections were
governed by majority voting, and ISS issued "withhold" recom-
mendations for 6.6 percent of the nominees. The percentage of
nominees with ISS "withhold" recommendations ("ISS WH Rec")
peaked in 2009 at 12.3 percent and then declined to 4 percent by
2012, while the percentage of directors subject to majority voting
73 "Withhold" votes are cast in elections under a PVR and "against" votes are cast in
elections under an MVR.
74 See Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 82 S Cal L Rev at 663-83, 696 (cited in note 18).
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climbed steadily from 14.8 percent in 2007 to 55.9 percent in
2013.75 These results are presented in Panel A of Table 2.76
Panel B provides summary statistics on the percentages of
directors under a PVR or an MVR that received above specified
cutoffs of "withhold" votes. For each cutoff, the difference between
the likelihood that directors under a PVR would receive "with-
hold" votes above the cutoff was higher than the respective likeli-
hood for directors under an MVR and the difference was signifi-
cant at the 1 percent confidence level. However, the relative
frequency gets starker the higher the level of "withhold" votes.
For example, the likelihood of getting a majority "withhold" vote
is 19 times higher for plurality than for majority vote companies,
whereas the likelihood of getting a 10 percent "withhold" vote is
only 1.7 times higher. Panel B also provides separate data on com-
panies that had adopted majority voting by 2009 ("early
adopters") and companies that subsequently adopted it ("late
adopters").
Panel C provides summary statistics on the frequency of ISS
"withhold" recommendations. As Panel C shows, nominees sub-
ject to an IVR are less likely to receive an ISS "withhold" recom-
mendation than nominees subject to a PVR. The overall frequen-
cies are 3.3 percent and 8.6 percent for majority voting and
plurality voting, respectively, a difference that is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent confidence level.77 Moreover, in each
year, the probability of receiving a negative ISS recommendation
was lower for nominees subject to majority voting than for nomi-
nees subject o plurality voting. The difference between majority
and plurality voting regimes is not significant for 2007 and 2008
75 We note that ISS "withhold" recommendations appear to have risen in response to
the financial crisis of 2008.
76 Our sample period includes the financial crisis of 2008. It is plausible that the
events surrounding the financial crisis made issuers more responsive to demands for gov-
ernance reform. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Gov-
ernance Round II, 95 Minn L Rev 1779, 1782-83, 1786-88 (2011) (explaining how condi-
tions surrounding the financial crisis created a climate that was conducive to governance
reforms, including "quack" reforms). We note, however, that the pace of adoption appears
fairly steady over the entire time period, as shown in Panel A of Table 2, rather than re-
flecting a concentration of firms that switched immediately following the crisis.
77 To assess statistical significance, we compute the difference between the frequen-
cies for majority voting and plurality voting and the standard error of the difference clus-
tered at the company level. See generally Vyacheslav Fos and Margarita Tsoutsoura,
Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J Fin Econ
316, 322 (2014) (comparing characteristics of board members using the standard error of
the difference clustered at the company level).
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and is significant at the 1 percent confidence level for 2009
through 2013.78
TABLE 2. PANEL A: DIRECTOR NOMINEES BY YEAR, ISS
RECOMMENDATION, AND VOTING RULE
Number of Directors Directors Directors Directors
Meeting Director % of with ISS with ISS % For under under
Year Nominees Total For Rec WH Rec Rec PVR MVR % MVR
2007 8,250 12.7% 7,717 533 93.5% 7,031 1,219 14.8%
2008 8,607 13,3% 8,056 551 93.6% 6,733 1,874 21.8%
2009 9,061 14.0% 7,951 1,110 87.7% 6,493 2,568 28.3%
2010 9,486 14.6% 8,657 829 91.3% 6,211 3,275 34.5%
2011 9,689 14.9% 9,257 432 95.5% 5,094 4,595 47.4%
2012 9,813 15.1% 9,421 392 96.0% 4,753 5,060 51.6%
2013 10,027 15.4% 9,586 441 95.6% 4,418 5,609 55.9%
Total: 64,933 100.0% 60,645 4,288 93.4% 40,733 24,200 37.3%
78 See id.
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TABLE 2. PANEL C: PLURALITY VERSUS MAJORITY VOTING-ISS
RECOMMENDATIONS PER YEAR
MVR Firms, MVR Firms,
PVR Firms MVR Firms Early Adopters Late Adopters
Directors Directors % Directors Directors
Total with ISS % WH Total with ISS WH with ISS % WH with ISS % WH
Year Directors WH Rec Rec Directors WH Rec Rec WH Rec Rec WH Rec Rec
2007 7,031 474 6.7% 1,219 59 4.8% 59 4.9% -
2008 6,733 460 6.8% 1,874 91 4.9% 91 4.9% -
2009 6,493 951 14.6% 2,568 159 6.2% 159 6.2% - -
2010 6,211 687 11.1% 3,275 142 4.3% 95 3.9% 47 5.6%
2011 5,094 336 6.6% 4,595 96 2.1% 43 1.8% 53 2.5%
2012 4,753 295 6.2% 5,060 97 1.9% 27 1.1% 70 2.6%
2013 4,418 290 6.6% 5,609 151 2.7% 34 1.4% 117 3.7%
Total 40,733 3,493 8.6% 24,200 795 3.3% 508 3.3% 287 3.3%
B. Data Analysis
1. The selection hypothesis: Are companies that adopted
majority voting different from those that did not?
As noted above, one problem with analyzing the effects of ma-
jority voting is that firms that adopt majority voting may be differ-
ent from firms that do not. Consider, for example, a company that
strives to have good corporate governance practices, as judged by
ISS, the Council of Institutional Investors, and large mutual funds.
As a result, none of its board members (other than the CEO) are
employees or have business dealings with the company, its com-
pensation committee employs exemplary procedures, its govern-
ance guidelines limit the number of board seats any director may
have, and its directors have high attendance rates. Because corpo-
rate governance professionals at ISS79 and many institutionso0 fa-
vor majority voting, the company has also adopted majority voting.
79 Institutional Shareholder Services Takes Stand on Majority Vote Standard.- Cur-
rent Director Election System Needs Reform (PR Newswire, Mar 11, 2005), archived at
http://perma.cc/2YCY-8VJA (quoting Dr. Martha Carter, ISS's director of US research, as
saying that "[a] majority vote standard transforms the director election process from a
symbolic gesture to a meaningful voice for shareholders"); Deane, Majority Voting in Dir-
ector Elections at *1 (cited in note 35).
80 The Council of Institutional Investors, in an August 11, 2011, letter to the Delaware
State Bar Association's Section of Corporate Law, proposed amending the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law to make majority voting the default setting: 'The benefits of a ma-
jority vote standard are many: it democratizes the corporate electoral process; it puts
real voting power in the hands of investors with minimal disruption to corporate affairs;
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For such a company, it is the company's underlying commitment to
shareholder-friendly corporate governance (and presumably the
reasons underlying that commitment, such as a committed board
and CEO or fear of ISS) that caused both the lower prospect of high
"withhold" votes and the adoption of majority voting.
To test for self-selection, we examined whether companies that
adopted majority voting are different from those that did not. We
compared companies that adopted majority voting in 2011, the
year in our data set that saw the largest number of adoptions, with
those that retained plurality voting. We then examined various
measures of shareholder-friendly governance for the prior two
years (2009 and 2010)-including the average percentage of "with-
hold" recommendations ("Avg ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years"), whether
the company's nominees had received any "withhold" recommen-
dations ("Any ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years"), the average percentage
of "withhold" votes ("Avg WH Vote Prior 2 Years"), the highest
"withhold" vote for any of the company's nominees ("High WH Vote
Prior 2 Years"), and whether any nominee received a "withhold"
vote above certain thresholds-both for companies that had
switched to majority voting in 2011 and for companies that re-
tained plurality voting in 2011. The results are reported in Table 3.
As Table 3 shows, companies that switched to majority voting
in 2011 had a different prior record than companies that retained
plurality voting. In the two years prior to the switch, companies
that switched in 2011 had a significantly lower percentage of
nominees who received a "withhold" recommendation (10.1 per-
cent versus 15.3 percent), a significantly lower likelihood that at
least one nominee would receive a "withhold" recommendation
(32.9 percent versus 41.8 percent), and a significantly lower like-
lihood of having a nominee receive a "withhold" vote of at least 30
percent (18.0 percent versus 25.2 percent).
The results reported in Table 3 support the selection hypoth-
esis. They indicate that companies whose nominees receive less
ISS support and experience less electoral success are overall less
likely to adopt majority voting. To the extent that electoral success
in subsequent years is correlated with ISS support and electoral
and it makes boards[] more representative of, and accountable to, shareowners." Jeff
Mahoney, General Counsel of the Council of Institutional Investors, Letter to Frederick
H. Alexander, Chair of the Delaware State Bar Association's Section of Corporate Law
*3 (Aug 11, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/SVQ9-DVWX.
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TABLE 3. ISS WITHHOLD RECOMMENDATIONS AND WITHHOLD
VOTE OUTCOMES FOR THE PRIOR TWO YEARS
Did Not Switched to
Variable Switch MVR
N Mean N Mean p-value
Avg ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years 827 0.153 167 0.101 0.011
Any ISS V Rec Prior 2 Years 827 0.418 167 0.329 0.032
Avg WH Vote Prior 2 Years 826 0.080 167 0.066 0.052
High WH Vote Prior 2 Years 826 0.189 167 0.168 0.125
Any Director Received > 20% WH 826 0.381 167 0.317 0.119
Vote Prior 2 Years
Any Director Received > 30% WH 826 0.252 167 0.180 0.046
Vote Prior 2 Years
Any Director Received > 40% WH 826 0.138 167 0.102 0.208
Vote Prior 2 Years
Any Director Received > 50% WH 826 0.052 167 0.048 0.825
Vote Prior 2 Years
If data for a particular company-year exists for only the prior first year and not
the prior second year, then the average is equal to the prior first-year data alone.
success in prior years, this self-selection would explain at least
part of the reason why nominees in companies with majority vot-
ing fare better than nominees in companies with plurality voting.
We note that our prior research has found a strong association
between an ISS "withhold" recommendation and the percentage
of "withhold" votes.8 1
To explore the self-selection hypothesis in greater detail, we
estimated a Cox proportional hazards model for the adoption of
majority voting during the 2007 to 2012 period. The Cox propor-
tional hazards model is a type of statistical survival model that
relates the time to a specified event (in our case, the adoption of
majority voting) to various independent variables that may affect
the amount of time to the event (such as the fraction of shares
that are held by institutional investors). The dependent variable
in the Cox proportional hazards model is a switch from a PVR to
an MVR. The hazards model initially includes all firms that used
81 See, for example, Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 3 Harv Bus L Rev at 64 (cited in note
28) (finding that "an ISS 'withhold' recommendation is a significant factor in predicting a
high 'withhold' vote").
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plurality voting for the election of directors in 2007. As firms
switch to majority voting, they drop out of the regression analysis.
The hazards model is consistent with the fact that many firms
move from plurality to majority voting, but few if any move back
to plurality voting once they have switched to majority voting.
We include as an independent variable in each model either
the mean of the percentage of ISS "withhold" recommendations for
the prior two years (Avg ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years); an indicator
variable for whether any of the director nominees at a firm received
an ISS "withhold" recommendation in the prior two years (Any ISS
WH Rec Prior 2 Years); or the highest "withhold" vote for any di-
rector nominee at a firm in the prior two years (High WH Vote
Prior 2 Years). Also, in all three models we included two additional
variables: whether the firm has a standing poison pill ("PPill") and
whether the firm has a classified board ("ClassBd").82 Because
both poison pills and classified boards are frowned upon by gov-
ernance activists, their presence may indicate that the firm has
less shareholder-friendly governance. A finding that firms with a
poison pill or with a classified board are less likely to adopt major-
ity voting would thus be consistent with the selection hypothesis.
As controls, we included an indicator variable for whether the
firm is incorporated in Delaware ("Delaware"); a variable for
whether the firm uses cumulative voting ("CumVote") (the MIVR
is not well-defined for firms using cumulative voting); two indica-
tor variables for whether the firm was in the top 5 percent or bot-
tom 5 percent of the companies in our sample based on the abnor-
mal return for the one-year period prior to the annual meeting
("Top5AbRet" and "Bot5AbRet") (firms with better stock perfor-
mance may be better able to resist pressure to adopt majority vot-
ing on the rationale of "never change a winning team"); the loga-
rithm of the market capitalization of the company ('ln(Mktcap)")
(reflecting the greater propensity of larger firms to adopt majority
voting);83 a variable for the percentage of shares held by institu-
tional investors ("Insthold"); and a variable for whether a charter
82 Our prior research has indicated that, while the presence of a poison pill is not
significantly associated with the electoral success of a firm's nominees, the presence of a
classified board is. See Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 59 Emory L J at 893-94 (cited in note 27).
83 We posit that the relationship between market capitalization and the adoption of
majority voting is nonlinear, with accelerating adoption at the higher levels of market
capitalization. We use a logarithm of market capitalization transformation to capture
this nonlinearity in the relationship. As a robustness test, we reestimated the models of
Table 4 with the inclusion of the nontransformed market capitalization instead of the
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amendment is required to adopt majority voting ("CharterAmend")
(making such adoption harder). We note that our prior research
indicated that company size is negatively associated with the per-
centage of "withhold" votes a nominee receives.84 To that extent,
the size variable may also pick up some selection effect. The size
variable may also reflect the potential pressure on the company
to adopt majority voting because larger issuers may receive more
media attention or greater governance pressure from institu-
tional investors.85
In the Cox proportional hazards model, a coefficient estimate
of less than one indicates that the variable is associated with a
reduced likelihood of the adoption of majority voting, and a coef-
ficient estimate of more than one indicates that the variable is
associated with an increased likelihood of the adoption of majority
voting. The z-statistics reported in Table 4 relate to whether the
coefficient is different from one.
The results are reported in Table 4, Models 1 to 3. They indi-
cate that having a prior record of ISS "withhold" recommendations
is negatively associated with the adoption of majority voting. That
is, a company whose nominees receive ISS "withhold" recommen-
dations is less likely to adopt majority voting, as the selection hy-
pothesis predicts. For example, Model 2 indicates that companies
that had at least one ISS "withhold" recommendation in the past
two years were, on average, 18.2 percent less likely to adopt major-
ity voting than companies that had no ISS "withhold" recommen-
dations, a decline that is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. In addition, in Models 2 and 3, the presence of a poison pill is
associated with a significantly lower likelihood (at the 10 percent
level) of adopting majority voting. We do not find, however, that
low "withhold" votes for directors in prior years or the absence of
a classified board (both evidence of shareholder responsiveness)
logarithm of market capitalization as an independent variable. Unreported, we obtained
the same qualitative results as in Table 4.
84 See Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 59 Emory L J at 893, 913 (cited in note 27).
85 The Cox proportional hazards model we estimate in Table 4 is as follows:
h(t, x) = h0(t)ex'
In the Cox proportional hazards model, h(t, x) is the hazard rate, x is the vector of regres-
sors, and P is the vector of estimated coefficients. For Model 1 of Table 4, we include in the
vector of regressors the following: Avg ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years, Delaware, PPill,
ClassBd, CumVote, Top5AbRet, Bot5AbRet, ln(Mktcap), Insthold, and CharterAmend.
The other models of Table 4 follow the same basic model with variations as noted in Ta-
ble 4 and the text.
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TABLE 4. HAZARDS MODEL FOR SWITCH TO MAJORITY VOTING
REGIME
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Avg ISS Any ISS High WH Avg ISS Any ISS High Avg ISS Any ISS
WH Rec WH Rec Vote WH Rec WH Rec WH Vote WH Rec WH Rec High WH
Prior 2 Prior 2 Prior 2 Prior 2 Prior 2 Prior 2 Prior 2 Prior 2 Vote Prior
Years Years Years Years Years Years Years Years 2 Years
Whole Whole Whole Early Early Early Late Late Late
Sample Sample Sample Adopters Adopters Adopters Adopters Adopters Adopters
Avg ISS WH 0.6281 0.440 0.693
Rec Prior 2 (-1.74) (-1.69) (-1.12)
Years
Any ISS WH 0.818* 0.736* 0.870
Rec Prior 2 (-2.08) (-2.16) (-1.04)
Years
High WH Vote 0.869 0.566 1.075
Prior 2 Years (-0.44) (-1.13) (0.17)
Delaware 1.240* 1.246* 1.250* 1.627** 1.641** 1.648** 0.906 0.909 0.913
(2.10) (2.15) (2.18) (3.30) (3.36) (3.39) (-0.67) (0.65) (-0.63)
PPill 0.844 0.835* 0.827
+  
0.725* 0.717" 0.718* 1.023 1.004 0.981
(-1.54) (-1.65) (-1.72) (-2.21) (-2.28) (-2.27) (0.13) (0.02) (-0.11)
ClassBd 1.023 1.003 1.015 1.087 1.059 1.066 0.983 0.968 0.976
(0.24) (0.04) (0.16) (0.65) (0.45) (0.50) (-0.13) (-0.25) (-0.18)
CumVote 0.592* 0.589* 0.588* 0.5511 0.548+ 0.541+ 0.631 0.628 0.632
(2.44) (-2.46) (-2.47) (-1.84) (-1.85) (-1.89) (-1.60) (-1.61) (-1.59)
Top5AbRet 0.529** 0.528** 0.530** 0.683 0.689 0.686 0.389* 0.386* 0.389*
(-2.64) (-2.65) (2.63) (-1.23) (-1.20) (-1.21) (-2.45) (-2.47) (-2.45)
Bot5AbRet 1.415 1.433 1.418 1.564 1.583 1.559 1.277 1.295 1.277
(1.50) (1.55) (1.51) (1.36) (1.40) (1.35) (0.75) (0.79) (0.75)
ln(Mktcap) 1.596** 1.600** 1.592** 1.627"* 1.637** 1.620"* 1.545** 1.546** 1.547**
(15.19) (15.26) (15.12) (11.61) (11.70) (11.50) (9.29) (9.33) (9.35)
Insthold 1.699
+  
1.671* 1.716
+  
1,442 1.393 1.468 2.258
+  
2.258+ 2.299
+
(1.86) (1.80) (1.90) (0.97) (0.87) (1.01) (1.85) (1.85) (1.88)
CharterAmend 0.654* 0.649** 0.653* 0.573* 0.564* 0.573* 0.694 0.690+ 0.687
+
(-2.54) (-2.58) (-2.54) (-2.08) (-2.13) (-2.07) (-1.70) (-1.72) (-1.74)
N 4693 4693 4668 2801 2801 2779 1892 1892 1889
Pseudo R
2  
0.042 0.042 0.041 0.055 0.056 0.054 0.031 0.030 0.030
Log Likelihood -3505.9 -3505.3 -3505.8 -1882.6 -1881.8 -1882.2 -1611.7 -1611.8 -1612.0
Exponentiated coefficients; z-statistics in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
correlate with an increased likelihood of a switch to majority voting.
As predicted, larger companies and companies with a larger per-
centage of institutional investors are more likely to adopt majority
voting. Companies with cumulative voting are less likely to do so. 86
86 We would predict that companies with a controlling shareholder are less likely to
adopt majority voting. We did not control for the presence of a controlling shareholder, in
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We examine two additional selection factors that are not di-
rectly related to corporate governance. First, we compare compa-
nies that are required to adopt majority voting through a charter
amendment o those that can adopt it through a bylaw. As noted
above, most states provide for plurality voting as the default rule
but authorize individual firms to opt in to majority voting. In
some states, majority voting must be provided for in the charter;
in others (including Delaware), majority voting may be imple-
mented through either a charter or bylaw amendment. Amending
the corporate charter is more difficult than a bylaw amendment
and typically requires both board approval and a shareholder
vote.87 In Models 1 through 3, the coefficient on CharterAmend is
less than one and is significant at either the 5 percent or 1 percent
level. Unsurprisingly, we find that the mechanism of adoption af-
fects the likelihood that firms will adopt majority voting; firms
that can adopt majority voting only via a charter amendment are
less likely to do so.
Second, we consider the extent to which the decision to adopt
majority voting may be tied to firm performance. There are two
possibilities. Better-performing firms may have more shareholder-
oriented governance, in which case we might see a correlation be-
tween performance and adoption of an MVR. Alternatively, share-
holders might seek greater accountability from the boards of
firms that perform less well, so that a high return insulates a
company from the pressure to adopt majority voting. Our findings
are consistent with the latter explanation. For companies in the
top 5 percent of abnormal stock price returns in the year before
the annual meeting (Top5AbRet), the likelihood of adopting ma-
jority voting is only about half as high as it is for companies in the
base category of comparison that are neither Top5AbRet nor
Bot5AbRet (that is, those companies in the middle, with returns
part because the universe of such companies includes some companies with a substantial
nonmajority shareholder as well as some in which shareholders exercise control through
dual-class stock. See Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United
States, 22 Rev Fin Stud 1377, 1379-85 (2009) (describing the prevalence of substantial
block-holders among US corporations). We note that the percentage of S&P 1500 issuers
with a controlling shareholder during the time period of our study was approximately 7
percent, including issuers in which control was exercised through dual-class stock. See
Sean Quinn, Controlled Companies in the S&P 1500: Performance and Risk Review (Har-
vard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Oct 25, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/7737-3ZQR.
87 See Siegel, 2011 Colum Bus L Rev at 370-71 (cited in note 20) (noting that out of
twenty-four states that require a charter amendment to change the voting procedure,
twenty-one require both board and shareholder approval).
The University of Chicago Law Review
ranging from the 5th percentile up to the 95th percentile in the
distribution of returns).
The analysis becomes particularly interesting when we dif-
ferentiate between early and late adopters. We reestimated Mod-
els 1 through 3 of Table 4 for only the years from 2007 to 2009
and report these models as Models 4 through 6 of Table 4 (the
early-adopter hazards models). We also reestimated Models 1
through 3 of Table 4 for those firms that were plurality voting
firms in 2009 for the years from 2010 to 2012 and report these
models as Models 7 through 9 of Table 4 (the late-adopter hazards
models). As with the full sample, we find that the prior record of
ISS "withhold" recommendations and the presence of a poison pill
are negatively associated with the adoption of majority voting by
early adopters. The effect is also economically significant. For ex-
ample, in Model 5, the point estimates indicate that, during the
early adoption period (2007 to 2009), having received an ISS "with-
hold" recommendation for any director in the last two years re-
duced the likelihood of adopting majority voting by 26.4 percent,
and having a poison pill reduced the likelihood by 28.3 percent. By
contrast, the variable for positive abnormal returns (which we in-
terpret as a measure of either pressure to adopt majority voting or
the board's ability to resist such pressure) is insignificant.
For late adopters, by contrast, the variables that were signif-
icant for the full sample and that we took as indicators of share-
holder responsiveness-the prior record of ISS "withhold" recom-
mendations and the presence of a poison pill-are now
insignificant. By contrast, the variable that may reflect reduced
outside pressure to adopt majority voting or the ability to resist
such pressure-positive abnormal returns-is significant, which
is consistent with lower pressure or a higher ability to resist pres-
sure making the adoption of majority voting less likely.88
In conclusion, we find some evidence consistent with early
adopters of majority voting differing from those that retain a plu-
rality standard: companies are more likely to adopt majority vot-
ing if they do not perceive their existing board members as being
at risk of receiving an ISS "withhold" recommendation, or if they
are generally more responsive to shareholder concerns (as proxied
88 Of course, strong performance does not guarantee that shareholders will not seek
to have the company adopt majority voting. See, for example, Barry B. Burr, Apple to Im-
plement CalPERS Majority-Voting Proposal (Pensions & Investments, Feb 23, 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/99AD-3G2C (describing Apple's decision to adopt majority voting
in response to efforts by CalPERS).
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by the absence of a poison pill). We find no statistically significant
evidence among early adopters that the ability to resist pressure
is related to the adoption of majority voting. The evidence is con-
sistent with the notion that early adopters adopt majority voting
voluntarily because they believe that it reflects the principles of
shareholder-friendly governance to which they already subscribe,
and not due to outside pressure.
For late adopters, we find no statistically significant evidence
of similar self-selection. In particular, we are unable to reject the
hypothesis that late adopters do not differ from nonadopters in
their prior electoral and ISS records. Late adopters, however, are
less likely to have experienced abnormally positive stock price
performance prior to adoption than nonadopters, which may have
increased the outside pressure to make governance changes.
There is one caveat to our results. The lack of a statistically
significant relationship for late adopters between the prior ISS
record and the decision to switch to majority voting may be due to
greater variance in the relationship. Despite this greater vari-
ance, it is possible that the average effect of the prior ISS record
on the decision to switch to majority voting is similar for early and
late adopters.89 The greater variance is nonetheless consistent
with at least some late adopters adopting majority voting only
semivoluntarily (that is, even if they have a poor prior ISS record)
compared with early adopters.
A plausible interpretation of these results is that shareholder
activists first pushed for the adoption of an MVR at firms where an
MVR may have been largely costless (or at least low-cost) because
these firms were already responsive to shareholders. As time went
by and MVRs became accepted as a best practice, firms for whom
89 As a robustness test, we reestimated Model 1 of Table 4 for the whole sample, di-
viding Avg ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years into an early version (for 2007 to 2009) and a late
version (for 2010 to 2012). We reestimated Models 2 and 3 of Table 4 for the whole sample
using early and late versions of Any ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years and High WH Vote Prior
2 Years, respectively, in each model. Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results
as in Models 4 through 9 of Table 4. The coefficients on the early versions of the Avg ISS
WH Rec Prior 2 Years and Any ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years variables were significantly
different from zero (at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively). The coefficients
on the late version of the Avg ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years and Any ISS WH Rec Prior 2
Years variables were not significant. An F-test of the differences between the early and
late versions of Any ISS WH Rec Prior 2 Years and High WH Vote Prior 2 Years, nonethe-
less, showed that the differences were not statistically significant. The coefficients on the
early and late versions of High WH Vote Prior 2 Years were not significantly different
from zero.
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an MVR was more costly-because they were less shareholder re-
sponsive-began to adopt it as well. Shareholder activists instead
could have first targeted the least shareholder-responsive firms
with their MVR campaigns as a way of improving the governance
of the firms that, in their eyes, needed it most, ignoring the firms
that were already responsive. This is inconsistent with our finding
that the early adopters were most shareholder responsive, and
thus does not seem to have been what happened.
2. The causation hypothesis: the effects of majority voting
on subsequent electoral success.
One way to distinguish between selection and causation is to
examine a particular firm both before and after the adoption of
majority voting. To the extent that a firm that adopted an MVR
had shareholder-friendly governance prior to adoption and main-
tained it throughout the measurement period, any changes in the
actions of the firm and the level of voting support are not attribut-
able to self-selection. If, however, the adoption of MVR changed
director responsiveness to shareholders, increased the level of
electioneering, or generated greater shareholder self-restraint,
we would expect to see a reduction in "withhold" votes after the
adoption of majority voting.
To test this possibility, we ran a set of ordinary least squares
regressions on company-director-level data including firm-fixed
effects. By including firm-fixed effects, we compare the record of
each company after the adoption of majority voting to the firm's
own record prior to the adoption, after controlling for other fac-
tors. In particular, by including year-fixed effects, we also control
for secular time trends. As dependent variables, we initially use
an indicator variable for whether a specific director received a
"withhold" vote of 30 percent or more ("Whvote30").90 A 30 percent
"withhold" vote is a sign of serious shareholder dissatisfaction.91
90 We chose 30 percent, rather than 50 percent, as a threshold because of the small
number of elections in which a nominee received a majority "withhold" vote. We have also
observed elsewhere that commentators consider "withhold" votes substantial at well under
50 percent. See Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 3 Harv Bus L Rev at 63 n 113 (cited in note 28)
(collecting sources).
91 See Ron Orol, Attack of the Zombie Director: A Look at Directors Who Stay on
Boards Though Shareholders Oppose Them Year after Year (The Deal, Aug 6, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/S7RY-VBWG ('"Most governance observers contend that even a
30% no vote demonstrates a sufficient level of shareholder discontent warranting a com-
pany's response."); Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 3 Harv Bus L Rev at 63 (cited in note 28)
(defining "a high 'withhold' vote as a 'withhold' vote of 30% or more of the votes cast").
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In robustness checks, we repeat our analysis with different
thresholds.
Our key independent variable of interest is the variable
"MVR," which takes the value of one if the nominee is elected un-
der an MVR and zero otherwise. The causation hypothesis pre-
dicts a negative coefficient for the MVR variable. We included as
controls year-fixed effects and several variables that our prior re-
search indicated may affect ISS recommendations or the percent-
age of "withhold" votes.92 These included a variable for the per-
centage of shares held by institutional investors (Insthold);
whether the CEO of the company was in the top 5 percent of total
excess compensation ("Top5AbComp"); the natural logarithm of
the market capitalization of the company (ln(Mktcap)) (reflecting
the greater propensity of larger firms to adopt majority voting);
the standard deviation in the company's stock return measured
for the one-year period prior to the annual meeting ("SDret"); and
two indicator variables for whether the firm was in the top 5 per-
cent or bottom 5 percent of companies in our sample based on the
abnormal holding period return for the one-year period prior to
the annual meeting (Top5AbRet and Bot5AbRet).93
Model 1 includes observations for all years. Model 2 excludes
observations for the two years following the adoption of a share-
holder resolution calling for majority voting. Model 2 thus ac-
counts for the possibility that shareholders may "punish" direc-
tors for a failure to implement majority voting-or "reward" them
for implementing majority voting-following the adoption of such
a resolution. Model 3 excludes, in addition, observations for the
first year in which a company employed majority voting (regard-
less of whether there was a shareholder resolution), reasoning
again that shareholders may "reward" these companies, resulting
in an unusually low likelihood of a 30 percent "withhold" vote.
Model 4 includes observations from only firms that eventually
adopted majority voting. The results are reported in Panel A of
Table 5.
92 See Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 82 S Cal L Rev at 671-72 (cited in note 18).
93 We estimate Model 1 in Panel A of Table 5 using ordinary least squares with er-
rors clustered by company as follows:
Whvote30i = a + PiMvVRi + 02ilnstholdi
+ 03iTop5AbCompi + 04iln(Mktcap)i
+ 05iSDreti + 06iTop5AbReti
+ P7iBot5AbReti + Firm Effects + Year Effect +ei
The other models of Panels A through C of Table 5 follow the same basic model with vari-
ations as noted in Table 5 and the text.
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The results of these regressions lend support to the hypothe-
sis that adoption of majority voting induced some change in be-
havior. After a company adopts an MVR, the likelihood that a
nominee of that company will receive a "withhold" vote in excess
of 30 percent drops by 2 to 3 percentage points relative to when
the company was under a PVR, a decline that is statistically sig-
nificant.94 The results are robust to the exclusion of observations
for the two years following the approval of a shareholder resolu-
tion calling for majority voting (Model 2), to the further exclusion
of observations for the first year in which a company employed
majority voting (Model 3), and to the exclusion of observations
from firms that never adopted majority voting (Model 4).
Because the regressions employ firm-fixed effects, self-selection
would not explain the results if the exogenous probability that a
company nominee would attract a high "withhold" vote is stable
over time for each company. However, the possibility exists that
a firm suffered from an exogenous shock that decreased that prob-
ability and, due to that shock, also decided to adopt majority vot-
ing. To address this possibility, we ran a separate regression in-
cluding observations from only firms that adopted majority voting
after shareholders adopted a proposal calling for the institution
of majority voting (Model 5). These firms adopted majority voting
under significant pressure, rather than by choice. We again find
a statistically significant decrease in the probability that a nomi-
nee of that company will receive a "withhold" vote in excess of 30
percent relative to when the company was under plurality voting.
We ran the regressions (with the full set of observations) us-
ing thresholds of 10 percent, 20 percent, 40 percent, and 50 per-
cent, reported in Models 6 through 9 of Panel A of Table 5, and
also obtained statistically significant results2 We note, however,
94 As a robustness test, we estimated Model 1 in Panel A of Table 5 without firm-
fixed effects. We obtained the same qualitative results as in Model 1. In particular, the
coefficient on MVR remained negative and is significant at the 1 percent level (and of
similar magnitude as the coefficient in Model 1). We also estimated Model 1 in Panel A of
Table 5 with firm-fixed effects but without any control variables. The coefficient on MVR
remained negative and is significant at the 1 percent level (and of similar magnitude as
the coefficient in Model 1).
95 The coefficient on MVR in our models in Panel A of Table 5 with firm-fixed effects
represents an average effect of majority voting for all directors. It may be that the shift to
majority voting did in fact result in a greater "withhold" vote for some directors-but this
effect is muted by the same amount of, or more, votes for other directors after the shift to
majority voting. We compared the standard deviation of the percentage of "withhold" votes
and the incidence of Whvote3O for the directors at the same company both prior to and
after the shift to an MVR. If some directors received more "withhold" votes but others in
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that the coefficients for MVR in the regressions using a 10 percent
and a 20 percent cutoff are close to the coefficient for MVR in the
regression using a 30 percent cutoff. In these regressions, the
MVR coefficients represent the change in the likelihood of receiv-
ing a "withhold" vote above the threshold. Thus, for example, the
likelihood of receiving a "withhold" vote above 30 percent, after
controlling for firm-fixed effects and other factors, declines by
2.59 percentage points after a company adopts an MVR (as re-
ported in Model 1). The likelihood of receiving a "withhold" vote
above 10 percent declines by 3.17 percentage points after a com-
pany adopts an MVR (as reported in Model 6). The similarity in
coefficients suggests that there is not a significant change in the
likelihood of receiving a "withhold" vote between 10 percent and
30 percent and that the results in the regressions using these
thresholds are driven by the reduced likelihood of a "withhold"
vote in excess of 30 percent. We explore this further below.
We next differentiated between early adopters and late
adopters of majority voting for each model in Panel A by including
separate dummy variables for each set of firms ("EarlyMVR" and
"LateMVR"). We report the results in Panel B of Table 5. For each
model in Panel B of Table 5, we include the same control variables
as in Panel A of Table 5. The results for late adopters are statis-
tically highly significant and of slightly higher magnitude than
the results for adopters as a whole. The results for early adopters
decline in magnitude relative to the results in Panel A, and in
several specifications, are statistically insignificant. F-tests of the
difference between EarlyMVR and LateMVR indicate that the dif-
ference is significant in Model 1 (p-value = 0.085), Model 4 (p-
value = 0.001), and Model 5 (p-value = 0.038).
To target more specifically the threshold level at which an
MVR reduces the probability of a "withhold" vote, we ran regres-
sions in which the dependent variable was, respectively, whether
a director received a "withhold" vote in the 10 to 30 percent range,
in the 30 to 40 percent range, or in the 40 to 50 percent range.
Panel C of Table 5 reports the results. For each model in Panel C
of Table 5, we include the same control variables as in Panel A of
Table 5.
the same company received fewer "withhold" votes after the shift to an MVR, we expect
that the standard deviation should increase after the shift. We found that, if anything, the
standard deviation of the percentage of "withhold" votes and the incidence of Whvote30
declined for companies after the shift to an MVR.
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The results for late adopters indicate a statistically signifi-
cant and economically meaningful reduction in the probabilities
for the 30 to 40 percent and the 40 to 50 percent ranges after the
adoption of an MVR. For early adopters, only the reduction in
probability for the 40 to 50 percent range was significant after the
adoption of an MVR. For both sets of adopters, there was no sig-
nificant effect on the probability of receiving a "withhold" vote in
the 10 to 30 percent range after the adoption of an MVR. F-tests
of the difference between EarlyMVR and LateMVR indicate that
the difference is significant only in Model 2 for the 30 to 40 per-
cent range (p-value = 0.050). In the 30 to 40 percent range, ma-
jority voting thus corresponds to a reduction in the probability of
a "withhold" vote for late adopters relative both to nonadopters
and to early adopters, and to no statistically significant reduction
for early adopters.
For further analysis, we matched firms that adopted majority
voting with plurality voting firms in the same industry (measured
by a two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code). If
there were more potential matches than MVR-adopting firms in
the industry, we matched firms based on closeness in market cap-
italization. If there were more MVR-adopting firms than potential
matches, we matched the MVR-adopting firms closest in market
capitalization to potential matches and eliminated those MVR-
adopting firms without a match.
We then looked at the difference in the likelihood of a high
"withhold" vote between directors at the firm that adopted majority
voting and directors at the matched firm. We looked at this differ-
ence before the adoption of MVR and at the difference in this differ-
ence after the adoption of MR ("Post-MVR Switch" is assigned the
value of one for the time period after the switch to MVR and zero
for the time period before the switch). "MVR Adopter" measures the
difference between firms that would eventually adopt an MVR and
their matches both before and after the adoption of majority voting;
Post-MVR Switch measures the difference during the post-adoption
period for both firms that adopted MVR and their respective
matches. Using a difference-in-differences model allows us to con-
trol for unobservable corporate governance differences between our
matched firms. Panel D of Table 5 reports logit models of a director
receiving a "withhold" vote of more than a specified threshold using
MVR Adopter, Post-MVR Switch, and '"MVR Adopter x Post-MVR
Switch" as independent variables. MVR Adopter x Post-MVR
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Switch measures the difference-in-difference variable.96 Model 1 in
Panel D of Table 5 includes observations for all years for director
elections in MVR Adopter firms and their matching nonswitching
firms. Model 2 excludes observations for the two years following
the adoption of a shareholder resolution calling for majority voting.
Model 3 excludes, in addition, observations for the first year in
which a company employed majority voting (regardless of whether
there was a shareholder esolution). Model 4 includes observations
from only MVR Adopter firms that adopted majority voting after
shareholders adopted a proposal calling for the institution of ma-
jority voting and their matching nonswitching firms. We also ran
the regressions (with the full set of observations for MVR Adopter
firms and their matching firms) using "withhold"-vote thresholds
of above 10 percent, 20 percent, and 40 percent, reported in Mod-
els 5 through 7 in Panel D of Table 5.97
The results of this analysis show a statistically significant neg-
ative coefficient for the interaction variable MVR Adopter x Post-
MVR Switch in each model in Panel D of Table 5-meaning that
after the switch, firms that adopt majority voting are less likely to
experience a high "withhold" vote relative to their matched firms
than they were before they made the switch. In Model 1, for exam-
ple, measured at the mean of all the independent variables, the
difference-in-differences interaction variable corresponds to a 3.5
percentage point reduction in the probability of receiving a "with-
hold" vote above 30 percent.98 These results, for adopters as a
whole, are consistent with the respective results in the firm-fixed
effects test.
96 We estimate Model 1 in Panel D of Table 5 using a logit model with errors clus-
tered by company as follows:
Prob(Whvote30=l)i = F{a + P3iMVR Adopteri + P2iPost-MVR Switchi
+ 03iMVR Adopter x Post-MVR Switchi
+ 4iInstholdi + PsiTop5AbCompi
+ 06iln(Mktcap)i + PTiSDreti + PiaTop5AbReti
+ OaBot5AbReti +ci}
The other models in Panels D and E of Table 5 follow the same basic model with variations
as noted in Table 5 and the text.
97 Unlike in Panel A of Table 5, we do not estimate a model using the threshold of above
50 percent for the "withhold" vote because none of the directors in MVR Adopter firms after
the switch to MVR received a "withhold" vote of over 50 percent. In other words, MVR
Adopter x Post-MVR Switch = 1 is perfectly correlated with Whvote50 = 0 in the model.
98 In the other models in Panel D of Table 5, the interaction terms correspond to the
following reductions in the probability of receiving a "withhold" vote at the threshold spec-
ified in each model: 3.3 percentage points in Model 2, 3.4 percentage points in Model 3, 5.4
percentage points in Model 4, 6.2 percentage points in Model 5, 5.5 percentage points in
Model 6, and 1.6 percentage points in Model 7.
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TABLE 5. PANEL C: RANGES
EarlyMVR
LateMVR
Insthold
Top5AbComp
ln(Mktcap)
SDret
Top5AbRet
Bot5AbRet
Model 1
Whvote > 10% and
Whvote < 30%
-0.00650
(-0.37)
-0.00547
(-0.36)
0.0128
(0.30)
0.0264
(1.26)
-0.0523**
(-4.55)
0.321
(0.50)
0.0137
(0.82)
0.0220
(1.20)
Model 2
Whvote > 30% and
Whvote < 40%
-0.00326
(-0.68)
-0.0180**
(-2.81)
0.00280
(0.18)
-0.00136
(-0.14)
-0.00579
(-1.08)
0.257
(0.75)
-0.00595
(-0.93)
0.00897
(1.12)
Model 3
Whvote > 40% and
Whvote < 50%
-0.00712*
(-2.26)
-0.00748*
(-2.51)
-0.000645
(-0.04)
0.00109
(0.28)
-0.00236
(-0.69)
-0.0429
(-0.19)
-0.00167
(-0.51)
0.00663
(0.84)
Constant 0.509** 0.0580 0.0305
(4.94) (1.34) (0.92)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 44,592 44,592 44,592
Adj R 2  0.135 0.123 0.113
t-statistics in parentheses; p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Errors are clustered
by company.
We next split the MVR Adopter and Post-MVR Switch varia-
bles from Panel D of Table 5 into separate variables for early
adopters ('"MVR Adopter Early" and "Post-MVR Switch Early")
and late adopters ("MVR Adopter Late" and "Post-MVR Switch
Late"), and we included associated interaction terms. We report
the results in Panel E of Table 5. When we segregate the sample
by including separate dummy and interaction variables for early
and late adopters, we find that the results for late adopters are
robust. In Models 1 to 3 using the 30 percent threshold and in the
regressions using the 10 percent, 20 percent, and 40 percent
1156 [83:1119
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thresholds, the coefficient for the interaction variable is signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient is insignificant only in
Model 4, possibly due to the much smaller sample size. The coef-
ficients for the interaction variables for late adopters are econom-
ically meaningful. Model 1, for example, measured at the mean of
all the independent variables the difference-in-differences inter-
action variable for late adopters corresponds to a 2.8 percentage
point reduction in the probability of receiving a "withhold" vote of
above 30 percent.99
For early adopters, however, we find no significant results in
Models 1 and 4 in Panel E of Table 5 and for thresholds of 10 per-
cent (Model 5) and 20 percent (Model 6). We find weaker signifi-
cant results in Models 2 and 3 (at the 10 percent and 5 percent
level, respectively), and strong results in only the regression us-
ing a 40 percent threshold (Model 7). Note also that the coefficient
for MVR Adopter Early is consistently and significantly negative
(except in Model 4). This presents further evidence that early
adopters had greater electoral success than other firms even be-
fore they adopted a majority vote rule-that is, evidence in favor
of self-selection by early adopters. There is no equivalent evidence
of self-selection by late adopters.
Overall, these results provide strong support for the proposi-
tion that the adoption of an MVR by late adopters reduced the
likelihood of getting a "withhold" vote of 30 percent or above. We
regard this result as most consistent with the deterrence or ac-
countability hypothesis or some form of the electioneering hypoth-
esis. While the shareholder-restraint hypothesis would also pre-
dict differential voting patterns, under that hypothesis the
difference should be most pronounced around the 50 percent
"withhold"-vote level at which the difference in voting rule trans-
forms a message of dissatisfaction (under the plurality rule) into
an actual effect on whether a nominee is elected (under the ma-
jority rule). For "withhold" votes of less than 50 percent, the mes-
sage under both rules is similar. Thus, unless shareholders have
99 In the other models in Panel E of Table 5 in which the interaction term for late
adopters is significant, the interaction terms for late adopters correspond to the following
reductions in the probability of receiving a "withhold" vote at the threshold specified in
each model: 2.5 percentage points in Model 2, 2.4 percentage points in Model 3, 6.5 per-
centage points in Model 5, 5.4 percentage points in Model 6, and 1.0 percentage point in
Model 7.
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great difficulty in predicting which votes will be close,100 share-
holder restraint should not affect the likelihood of receiving a
"withhold" vote in excess of 30 percent. Similarly, since companies
obtain intermediate vote results during the solicitation process,
they would almost certainly know whether any director were at
risk of receiving a majority "withhold" vote.10' Different voting
rules, therefore, should not affect electioneering efforts aimed at
shareholders (such as calling individual shareholders who tend to
support company nominees)102 in a way that results in different
probabilities of receiving a 30 percent "withhold" vote.
Deterrence or accountability, however, may be a more plau-
sible account for a different likelihood of receiving a "withhold"
vote of more than 30 percent. At the time that directors decide
whether to take an action that could result in a high "withhold"
vote, directors may not yet know whether the resulting "withhold"
vote will be around 30 percent or closer to 50 percent. To avoid
the risk of a majority "withhold" vote, directors may thus refrain
from taking the offensive action. This decision would also reduce
the risk of a 30 percent "withhold" vote. This is especially true for
actions that are likely to cause a large increase in "withhold"
votes.0 3 Similarly, companies may engage in differential efforts
to lobby ISS not to issue a "withhold" recommendation (a form of
electioneering) because an ISS recommendation is correlated with
a substantial percentage of votes and an ISS "withhold" recom-
mendation is a virtual prerequisite to a majority "withhold"
vote.104
100 Although the outcomes of some shareholder votes are too close to call, a variety of
mechanisms provide information to shareholders in advance of the actual vote, thereby
allowing shareholders to take that information into account in making their voting deci-
sions. See, for example, Jonathan Cheng and Min-Jeong Lee, As Vote Nears, Samsung
Pulls Out All the Stops (Wall St J, July 15, 2015), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
as-vote-nears-samsung-pulls-out-aU-the-stops-1436994473 (visited Feb 7, 2016) (Perma
archive unavailable) (describing the alignment of various shareholders prior to the vote at
a recent proxy contest at Samsung).
101 See Recommendations of the Investor Advisory Committee at *3 (cited in note 64)
(describing Broadridge's practice of providing preliminary or intermediate voting results
beginning ten to fifteen days prior to the annual meeting).
102 See Cheng and Lee, As Vote Nears, Samsung Pulls Out All the Stops (cited in note
100) (describing Samsung's efforts to solicit shareholder voting support, including deliver-
ing watermelons to individual shareholders).
103 For an analysis of which director actions are likely to correlate with a large "with-
hold" vote, see generally Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and David Oesch, Understanding
Uncontested Director Elections (unpublished manuscript), archived at
http://perma.c/QLR5-UXTB.
104 See Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 3 Harv Bus L Rev at 63 (cited in note 28) (reporting
that the probability of getting a "withhold" vote of at least 30 percent is only 0.1 percent
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TABLE 5. PANEL D: MATCHED SAMPLE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Excl 2 Yrs Only Firms
Excl 2 Yrs after SHs That Adopt
after SHs Adopt MVR MVR after
Adopt MVR Res + Yr of SHs Adopt
All Res Switch MVR Res All All All
Whvote30 Whvote30 Whvote30 Whvote30 Whvotel0 Whvote20 Whvote40
MVR Adopter -0.327 -0.307 -0.293 0.935 -0.208 -0.335 -0.238
(-1.26) (-1.27) (-1.19) (1.40) (-1.47) (-1.70) (-0.74)
Post-MVR 0.137 0.134 0.0887 -0.00558 0.0774 0.0751 0.219
Switch (0.59) (0.58) (0.32) (-0.01) (0.61) (0.45) (0.60)
MVR Adopter -1.862** -1.841** -2.001** -2.290
+  -0.592** -1.265** -2.655**
x Post.MVR (-5.49) (-5.42) (-5.16) (-1.96) (-3.42) (-5.04) (-5.30)
Switch
Insthold 0.603 0.728 0.628 1.510 0.372 0.436 1.374
(1.25) (1.51) (1.24) (1.24) (1.31) (1.14) (1.93)
Top5AbComp 0.631** 0.00905 0.118 0.127 0.575** 0.394 0.976*
(2.60) (0.03) (0.36) (0.16) (3.32) (1.78) (2.11)
ln(Mktcap) -0.116 -0.120 -0.142 -0.404 -0.130* -0.0770 -0.285*
(-1.18) (-1.31) (-1.40) (-1.25) (-2.56) (-0.94) (-2.27)
SDret 23.91** 26.49** 27.83** 29.33 12.28** 18.21** 21.23*
(3.27) (3.29) (3.31) (1.55) (2.94) (3.18) (1.98)
Top5AbRet -0.213 -0.117 -0.0915 0.0972 0.0723 0.202 -0.144
(-0.65) (-0.35) (-0.26) (0.12) (0.34) (0.71) (-0.29)
Bot5AbRet -0.104 -0.0509 -0.0325 0.277 0.176 0.0728 -0.145
(-0.30) (-0.14) (-0.08) (0.30) (1.04) (0.28) (-0.25)
Constant -3.214** -3.409** -3.203** -1.787 -1.249* -2.553** -3.388**
(-3.98) (-3.96) (-3.48) (-0.62) (-2.45) (-3.50) (-3.06)
N 21,970 20,549 17,621 2,646 21,970 21,970 21,970
pseudo R
2  
0.065 0.066 0.063 0.134 0.029 0.049 0.085
z-statistics in parentheses; 1p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Errors clustered by company.
Finally, an MVR may have more-subtle accountability ef-
fects. As some of us have argued elsewhere, the adoption of ma-
jority voting underlines the principle that shareholders are the
bosses.105 This may lead to a change in board attitude and induce
directors to adopt a more shareholder-centric view on other mat-
ters.06 Or, to the extent that a board was initially reluctant to
in the absence of a "withhold" recommendation from ISS, compared to a probability of 30
percent in the presence of an ISS "withhold" recommendation).
105 See Kahan and Rock, 94 BU L Rev at 2023-26 (cited in note 41).
106 See id at 2023-24.
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TABLE 5. PANEL E: MATCHED SAMPLE-EARLY VERSUS LATE
ADOPTERS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Excl 2 Yrs Only Firms
Excl 2 Yrs after SHs that Adopt
after SHs Adopt MVR MVR after
Adopt MVR Res + Yr of SHs Adopt
All Res
Whvote30 Whvote30
-1.337** -1.191**
(-2.95) (-2.77)
Post-MVR 0.213 0.239
Switch Early (0.66) (0.87)
MVR Adopter -0.735 -0.972'
Early x Post- (-1.37) (-1.90)
MVR Switch
Early x Post-
MVR Switch
Early
MVR Adopter -0.260 -0.246
Late (-0.99) (-1.00)
Post-MVR 0.0497 0.00036
Switch Late (0.18) (0.00)
MVR -2.084** -1.855**
Adopter Late (-5.11) (-4.27)
x Post-MVR
Switch Latex
Post-MVR
Switch Late
Insthold 0.612 0.733
(1.27) (1.52)
Top5AbCom 0.605* -0.0144
p (2.46) (-0.05)
ln(Mktcap) -0.115 -0.121
(-1.14) (-1.31)
SDret 22.41** 24.88**
(3.04) (3.06)
Top5AbRet -0.226 -0.131
(-0.69) (-0.39)
Bot5AbRet -0.0994 -0.0449
(-0.28) (-0.12)
Constant -3.184** -3.354**
(-3.89) (-3.91)
N 21,970 20,549
pseudo R2 0.067 0.068
1160
MVR
Adopter
Early
z-statistics m parentheses; Ip < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Errors clustered by company.
Switch MVR Res All All All
Whvote3 Whvote3
0 0 Whvotel0 Whvote20 Whvote40
-1.151** 0.0803 -0.727** -1.161** -0.8641
(-2.65) (0.07) (-2.89) (-2.77) (-1.73)
0.113 0.699 0.123 0.121 0.314
(0.36) (0.64) (0.66) (0.50) (0.63)
-1.409* -1.463 -0.0335 -0.227 -2.271**
(-2.40) (-0.95) (-0.11) (-0.49) (-3.16)
-0.239 0.937 -0.158 -0.270 -0.191
(-0.96) (1.42) (-1.10) (-1.35) (0.58)
0.0456 -2.955* 0.0275 0.0281 0.107
(0.10) (-2.42) (0.20) (0.13) (0.29)
-1.650** -0.897 -0.683** -1.646** -2.436**
(-2.79) (-0.56) (-3.41) (-5.22) (-4.02)
0.642 2.2141 0.382 0.447 1.382
+
(1.26) (1.75) (1.35) (1.18) (1.94)
0.103 0.0198 0.559** 0.370
+  
0.960*
(0.31) (0.03) (3.22) (1.67) (2.06)
-0.137 -0.372 -0.129* -0.0767 -0.286*
(-1.34) (-1.28) (-2.49) (-0.91) (-2.20)
26.74** 37.06
+  
11.28** 16.82** 20.02
+
(3.15) (1.88) (2.69) (2.92) (1.77)
-0.103 -0.0479 0.0653 0.194 -0.162
(-0.29) (-0.06) (0.31) (0.68) (-0.32)
-0.00566 0.340 0.176 0.0671 -0.136
(-0.01) (0.37) (1.02) (0.26) (-0.23)
-3.217** -2.883 -1.233* -2.525** -3.352**
(-3.51) (-1.19) (-2.40) (-3.43) (-2.95)
17,621 2,646 21,970 21,970 21,970
0.064 0.174 0.031 0.052 0.086
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adopt majority voting, the fact that proponents of majority voting
eventually prevailed may be a show of strength that induces di-
rectors to offer less resistance to shareholder-rights advocates on
other matters.107
By contrast, our results for early adopters provide support for
the causation hypothesis only for levels of "withhold" votes in ex-
cess of 40 percent. Such an effect would be compatible with any of
the three forms of causation hypotheses that we discussed: deter-
rence or accountability, electioneering, and shareholder estraint.
3. The deterrence or accountability hypothesis: the effect of
the MVR on primary conduct.
To examine the deterrence hypothesis more directly, one
could examine whether board actions, rather than electoral suc-
cess, change after the adoption of majority voting. This question
goes to the core of the claim that majority voting increases board
accountability. An increase in shareholder support for directors
after the switch to majority voting does not necessarily mean that
the directors are behaving differently; voting results can alterna-
tively be the result of electioneering by the issuer or restraint by
shareholders under an MVR. The distinction between the deter-
rence hypothesis and the electioneering and shareholder-restraint
hypotheses lies in whether majority voting affects primary board
behavior (making the board less likely to take actions that gener-
ate shareholder opposition) or whether it affects the voting out-
come given primary board behavior (reducing "withhold" votes
due to electioneering or shareholder estraint). Evidence that pri-
mary board behavior changes after the adoption of majority vot-
ing would be evidence supporting the deterrence hypothesis, as
distinguished from the electioneering and shareholder-restraint
hypotheses. Evidence that the voting outcomes change after the
adoption of majority voting even if there is no change in primary
board behavior, in turn, would constitute evidence in favor of the
electioneering or shareholder-restraint hypotheses, to the exclu-
sion of the deterrence hypothesis.
In prior research, three of us have identified two types of board
behavior that are associated with a substantial increase in "with-
hold" votes: a director's failure to attend at least 75 percent of the
board or committee meetings ("Attendless75") and a board's failure
to implement a shareholder proposal that had been adopted by
107 Id at 2024-26.
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shareholders ("Failure to Implement").108 Attendless75, in particu-
lar, is strongly associated both with the likelihood of ISS issuing a
"withhold" recommendation and with the expected "withhold" vote
given an ISS "withhold" recommendation.109 If an MVR has any de-
terrent effect, it is especially likely to be reflected in Attendless75,
given the substantial effect of such failure on "withhold" votes and
the dichotomous nature of the variable.110
Both of these measures, however, also have problems. Com-
panies can to some extent manipulate whether a director failed to
attend at least 75 percent of the board or committee meetings. For
example, if a director is just below that threshold, a company
could schedule an additional committee meeting, if only a brief
one, to enable the director to cross it. Similarly, many companies
adopt, or promise to adopt, shareholder proposals before they
come up for a vote, thereby inducing withdrawal of the proposal
or rendering the proposal moot (and hence excludable from the
proxy statement). The implementation rate of proposals that
came to a vote and received majority support is thus a potentially
biased measure of a company's responsiveness to shareholder pro-
posals. Moreover, to the extent that firms that employ an MVR
and firms that employ a PVR differ in the degree of shareholder-
oriented governance, as indicated by the earlier results, they may
differ not just in their inclination to implement proposals but also
in the likelihood that they will receive proposals that will be sup-
ported by a majority of shareholders. On the one hand, if their
governance is more shareholder oriented, shareholders may per-
ceive fewer problems that they want to address through pro-
posals. On the other hand, if these firms are perceived to be more
shareholder friendly, shareholders may make more proposals be-
cause they perceive a higher likelihood of adoption. Controlling
for such endogeneity is thus a necessity.
In addition, Attendless75 may not be typical of other actions
that induce a "withhold" vote. A failure to attend board meetings
is one of the relatively few actions in which individual directors
108 See Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 82 S Cal L Rev at 661-62, 671-73 (cited in note 18).
109 See id.
110 The 75 percent threshold is defined by SEC disclosure rules and ISS "withhold"
recommendation policies. See 17 CFR § 229.407(b)(1) (requiring companies to "[n]ame
each incumbent director who during the last full fiscal year attended fewer than 75 percent
of the aggregate of: [ ] [t]he total number of meetings of the board of directors ... [and]
[t]he total number of meetings held by all committees of the board on which he served");
Gregory, How to Address ISS & Glass Lewis Policy Changes (cited in note 60) (describing
ISS's policy of using 75 percent attendance as a threshold for "withhold" recommendations).
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act contrary to the interest of the board as a whole. In a sense,
they reflect director-board agency costs (in addition to director-
shareholder agency costs). By contrast, most other actions that
induce "withhold" votes-such as not implementing a shareholder
proposal, approving abnormally high CEO compensation, or hav-
ing business relations with the company-are approved by the
board and are, at least arguably, in the best interest of the com-
pany (and thus reflect actual or perceived board-shareholder
agency costs).
In Table 6, we provide summary statistics with respect to di-
rector attendance. The first column of Table 6 provides the per-
centage of directors who failed to attend the requisite percentage
of meetings (Attendless75). The second column of Table 6 pro-
vides the percentage of directors who failed to attend the requisite
percentage of meetings and also received an ISS "withhold" rec-
ommendation ("Attendless75 x ISS WH Rec"). The first column
can be interpreted as a failure to attend for invalid as well as valid
reasons (for example, temporary illness). The second column can
be interpreted as a more precise measure of a failure to attend for
invalid reasons, but it may also include the effect of ISS biases
and of electioneering (that is, companies lobbying ISS not to issue
a "withhold" recommendation).
To control for selection effects and possible time trends, we
ran regressions using, respectively, Attendless75 and Attend-
less75 x ISS WH Rec as dependent variables, with independent
variables including MVR, firm- and year-fixed effects, and the
same additional controls as in Table 5.111 Our results, reported in
Models 1 and 2 of Table 7, indicate that an MVR is associated
with a statistically significant reduction in Attendless75 and At-
tendless75 x ISS WH Rec for adopters as a whole. These results
present direct evidence that adoption of an MVR results in a re-
duced likelihood that directors will fail to attend at least 75 per-
cent of the board meetings. We next test the effect of MVRs on
early and late adopters, respectively (Models 3 and 4 of Table 7).
111 We estimate Model 1 in Table 7 using ordinary least squares with errors clustered
by company as follows:
Attendless75i = a + P3iMVRi + IaIlnstholdi
+ P3iTop5AbCompi + P4iln(Mktcap)i
+ PsiSDreti + 06iTop5AbReti
+ P7iBot5AbReti + Firm Effects + Year Effect +ci
The other models in Table 7 follow the same basic model with variations as noted in Ta-
ble 7 and the text.
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The coefficients on LateMVR are negative and significant at the
10 percent level for both Attendless75 and Attendless75 x ISS
WH Rec. For early adopters, the coefficient on EarlyMVR is neg-
ative and significant only for Attendless75 (Model 3 of Table 7).
In both Models 3 and 4, F-tests of the differences between
LateMVR and EarlyMVR are not significantly different from zero.
We thus do not find evidence that the impact of adopting MVR on
Attendless75 and Attendless75 x ISS WH Rec differs between
early and late adopters of MVR.
We ran similar regressions using the failure to implement a
shareholder proposal that received majority support as the dependent
variable (Failure to Implement).112 Since the decision to imple-
ment a proposal is company-wide, these regressions were run on
a company level. Results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Ta-
ble 7. The coefficients for whether the company has adopted ma-
jority voting are insignificant.113 We thus find no evidence of in-
creased accountability with respect to this measure of
shareholder friendliness.114
112 For this study, we collected data on shareholder governance proposals that re-
ceived more "for" votes than "against" votes during the 2007 to 2012 proxy seasons and in
which the implementation of the proposal would have resulted in an SEC filing. We omit-
ted proposals to implement majority voting, since these proposals affect only firms with
plurality voting. We further omitted "say on pay" proposals for 2009 and subsequent years
because federal "say on pay" legislation was already pending when these proposals would
have been implemented. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 951, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 1899 (2010), codified at 15 USC § 78n-1 (re-
quiring the SEC to adopt rules implementing an advisory shareholder vote on executive
compensation). When a firm had multiple shareholder proposals that received more "for"
votes than "against" votes in a particular proxy season, we treated the firm as not imple-
menting a proposal if it failed to implement at least one of the proposals. Overall, the
implementation rate was significantly higher for MVR than for PVR companies (82.8 per-
cent versus 56.7 percent). The requirement that implementation trigger an SEC filing in-
creases the likelihood that either implementation or a failure to implement would be read-
ily visible to both ISS and shareholders.
113 In unreported robustness checks including only companies in which a proposal had
received majority support, the MVR variable was similarly insignificant in regressions
that included firm-fixed effects.
114 We note that we cannot control for the quality of the shareholder proposals that
an issuer receives, a factor that may influence our results if majority voting issuers receive
higher- or lower-quality shareholder proposals than plurality voting issuers.
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TABLE 6. SUMMARY STATISTICS: FRACTION OF DIRECTORS
WHO FAILED TO ATTEND 75 PERCENT OF MEETINGS
Attendless75 x
Attendless75 ISS WH Rec
PVR 0.606% 0.405%
MVR 0.344% 0.113%
Difference 0.262%** 0.292%**
Standard Error of 0.08% 0.06%
Difference
EarlyMVR 0.403% 0.124%
LateMVR 0.212% 0.088%
Difference 0.191%* 0.036%
EarlyMVR and LateMVR
Standard Error of 0.09% 0.05%
Difference
EarlyMVR and LateMVR 0.191% 0.036%
Difference 0.203%* 0.281%**
PVR and EarlyMVR
Standard Error of 0.09% 0.08%
Difference
Difference 0.394%** 0.316%**
PVR and LateMVR
Standard Error of 0.13% 0.10%
Difference
The Difference row reports the difference between the PVR and MVR rows. The
Standard Error rows reports the standard error of the differences, clustered at the
company level. For an example of a comparison of director characteristics using the
standard error clustered at the company level, see Vyacheslav Fos and Margarita
Tsoutsoura, Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests,
114 J Fin Econ 316, 322 (2014). The Difference rows also report the statistical
significance of the differences computed using the standard error as follows: + p < 0.10,
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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TABLE 7. PRIMARY BOARD BEHAVIOR: REGRESSION RESULTS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Attendless Attendless
Attendless 75 x ISS Attendless 75 x ISS Failure to Failure to
75 WH Rec 75 WH Rec Implement Implement
MVR -0.00397* -0.00292* -0.000222
(-2.36) (-2.30) (-0.03)
EarlyMVR -0.00609
+  
-0.00292 .0.00286
(-1.88) (-1.51) (-0.18)
LateMVR -0.003041 -0.00292
+  
0.000869
(-1.71) (-1.95) (0.10)
Insthold 0.0000067 0.00182 -0.0000220 0.00182 -0.00906 -0.00910
(0.00) (0.25) (-0.00) (0.25) (-0.41) (-0.41)
Top5AbCo 0.00307 0.000376 0.00313 0.000376 -0.00126 -0.00121
mp (1.57) (0.38) (1.61) (0.38) (-0.10) (-0.10)
ln(Mktcap) -0.00179 -0.00109 -0.00181 -0.00109 0.00399 0.00397
(-1.08) (-0.81) (-1.09) (-0.81) (0.57) (0.57)
SDret 0.0685 0.0611 0.0692 0.0611 -0.0380 -0.0370
(0.74) (0.79) (0.75) (0.79) (-0.12) (-0.12)
Top5AbRet -0.000633 -0.00121 -0.000591 -0.00121 -0.0138 -0.0138
(-0.30) (-0.74) (-0.28) (-0.74) (-1.46) (-1.46)
Bot5AbRet -0.00692** -0.00438* -0.00691** -0.00438* 0.00965 0.00962
(-2.60) (-1.97) (-2.60) (-1.98) (0.78) (0.77)
Constant 0.0205 0.0111 0.0209 0.0111 -0.00679 -0.00651
(1.24) (0.82) (1.27) (0.81) (-0.12) (-0.11)
Year-Fixed
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 44,888 44,888 44,888 44,888 6,932 6,932
Adj R2 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.067 0.067
t-statistics in parentheses; p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Errors are clustered by company.
4. The electioneering and shareholder-restraint
hypotheses' majority withhold votes given primary
conduct.
Both the deterrence and the selection hypotheses posit that
nominees of majority voting companies behave differently than
nominees of plurality voting companies (albeit for different rea-
sons) and that this difference in behavior explains the differential
vote patterns. But it is also possible that the same primary direc-
tor behavior generates a different electoral outcome depending on
the voting regime. Evidence of such a change in the voting out-
come would constitute evidence in favor of electioneering and
shareholder estraint.
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To test for this possibility, we compiled a sample of director
nominees who committed equivalent "offenses" against shareholder-
friendly governance. We then calculated whether the probability of
that nominee receiving a majority "withhold" vote1 5 differs depend-
ing on whether the nominee is elected under a PVR or an MVR. A
higher likelihood for nominees subject to plurality voting would be
consistent with electioneering by majority voting companies or re-
strained voting by shareholders of majority voting companies.
We identify the following five offenses:
" The nominee receiving an ISS "withhold" recommen-
dation (ISS WH Rec);
* The nominee missing more than 25 percent of board
and committee meetings (Attendless75);
* The nominee receiving an ISS "withhold" recommen-
dation and missing more than 25 percent of board and
committee meetings (Attendless75 x ISS WH Rec);
* The nominee being an incumbent director of a com-
pany that has failed to implement a shareholder pro-
posal that has received majority support (Failure to
Implement);
" The nominee receiving an ISS "withhold" recommen-
dation and being an incumbent director of a company
that has failed to implement a shareholder proposal
that has received majority support ("Failure to Imple-
ment x ISS WH Rec").
Note that some of these categories of offensive conduct in-
clude having received an ISS "withhold" recommendation. In
these categories, a differential likelihood of receiving a majority
"withhold" vote could reflect electioneering oriented toward
shareholders. Any electioneering that takes the form of lobbying
ISS not to issue a "withhold" recommendation may not be re-
flected in a differential likelihood of receiving a majority "with-
hold" vote.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the summary statistics. In each
category, the probability of receiving a majority "withhold" vote
was substantially lower for nominees subject to an MVR than for
nominees subject to a PVR. As Panel A shows, the likelihood of
receiving a majority "withhold" vote given the primary behavior
115 We focus here on majority "withhold" votes rather than high "withhold" votes on the
assumption that both issuers and shareholders may perceive the legal significance of a ma-
jority "withhold" vote differently under an MVR, despite the evidence of the limited frequency
with which directors who fail to receive majority support lose their board positions.
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is significantly higher for plurality voting companies than for ma-
jority voting companies under each of the five measures. The dif-
ferences, nonetheless, are significant only for ISS WH Rec, At-
tendless75, and Failure to Implement.
The results in Panel A, however, may be driven by selection
effects. Different firms may have varying prior information on
whether offensive conduct is likely to result in a majority "with-
hold" vote. For example, firms in which the board controls a high
fraction of the votes are presumably less likely to receive a major-
ity "withhold" vote than firms in which the board controls only a
low fraction of votes. Firms that adopt an MVR may be those that
are more sensitive to these priors than firms that choose to retain
a PVR. Such MVR-adopting firms may generally be better able
(whether under an MVR or a PVR) to assess when engaging in
offensive conduct will not result in a majority "withhold" vote, and
thus may engage in offensive conduct only in circumstances when
it is unlikely to result in a majority "withhold" vote.
To address these selection effects, we ran firm-fixed-effects
regressions. The dependent variable in these regressions is the
likelihood of receiving a majority "withhold" vote. Because our
a priori view is that electioneering or shareholder restraint will
be most likely to take place when a vote otherwise may cross the
50 percent "withhold"-vote threshold, we focus on the likelihood
of receiving a majority "withhold" vote to test the impact of elec-
tioneering or shareholder estraint. As independent variables, we
include-in addition to firm-fixed effects-a dummy variable for
an MVR, a dummy variable for one of the five "offenses," an inter-
action of these dummy variables, and the same controls as in the
models in Table 5.116 If, given the same offensive conduct, an MVR
is associated with a reduced likelihood of a majority "withhold"
vote, we expect a negative coefficient for the interaction dummy.
We further predict a negative coefficient for the MVR dummy and
a positive coefficient for the "offense"-conduct variable. These re-
sults are reported in Panel B of Table 8.117
116 Note that the variables in the models in Panels B and C of Table 8 that include
ISS WH Rec test only for electioneering of votes directly, not indirectly via ISS lobbying.
117 We estimate Model 1 in Panel B of Table 8 using ordinary least squares with er-
rors clustered by company as follows:
Whvote50i = a + PliMVRi + f2IjSS WH Reci
+ P3iMVR x ISS WH Reci + P4iInstholdi
+ P5siTop5AbCompi + 06iln(Mktcap)i
+ P7iSDreti + flsiTop5AbReti
+ 19iBot5AbReti + Firm Effects + Year Effect +ei
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TABLE 8. PANEL A: MAJORITY 'WITHHOLD"-VOTE OUTCOMES
Plurality Voting
Regime
Fraction of
Directors
Who
Received a
Majority
WH-Vote
Majority Voting
Regime
Fraction of
Directors
Who
Received a
Majority
WH-Vote Standard
N Outcome N Outcome Difference Error
ISS WH Rec 3,454 0.072 787 0.010 0.062** 0.020
Attendless75 219 0.137 64 0.016 0.121* 0.052
Attendless75 146 0.205 21 0.048 0.158 0.101
x ISS WH Rec
Failure to 589 0.051 461 0.002 0.049* 0.024
Implement
Failure to 254 0.118 51 0.020 0.099 0.092
Implement x
ISS WH Rec
The Difference column reports the difference between the Plurality and Majority columns. The Standard
Error column reports the standard error of the differences, clustered at the company level. For an
example of a comparison of director characteristics using the standard error clustered at the company
level, see Vyacheslav Fos and Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career
Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J Fin Econ 316, 322 (2014). The Difference column also reports the
statistical significance of the difference computed using the standard error as follows: + p < 0.10,
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
The other models in Panels B and C of Table 8 follow the same basic model with variations
as noted in Table 8 and the text.
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TABLE 8. PANEL B: REGRESSIONS: MAJORITY "WITHHOLD"-VOTE
OUTCOMES, FIRM-FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSIONS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Whvote50 Whvote50 Whvote50 Whvote50 Whvote50
MVR -0.00197 -0.00418* -0.00425* -0.00395* -0.00402*
(-1.35) (-2.53) (-2.58) (-2.22) (.2.34)
ISS WH Rec 0.0697**
(7.92)
MVR x ISS WH Rec -0.0652**
(-7.36)
Attendless75 0. 140*
(4.84)
MVR x Attendless75 -0.122**
(-3.59)
Attendless75 x ISS WH 0.204**
Rec (5.05)
MVR x -0.146*
Attendless75 x ISS WH (-2.12)
Rec
Failure to Implement 0.0339*
(2.24)
MVR x Failure to -0.0280'
Implement (-1.82)
Failure to Implement x 0.0960**
ISS WH Rec (2.87)
MVR x Failure to -0.0658
Implement (-1.49)
x ISS WH Rec
Insthold -0.00393 -0.00595 -0.00621 -0.00613 -0.00613
(-0.39) (-0.55) (-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.56)
Top5AbComp 0.00345 0.00159 0.00195 0.00178 0.00226
(1.02) (0.55) (0.67) (0.57) (0.66)
ln(Mktcap) 0.000404 0.000198 0.000165 0.0000159 -0.000114
(0.21) (0.11) (0.09) (0.01) (-0.06)
SDret -0.137 -0.116 -0.117 -0.116 -0.105
(-1.55) (-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.31) (-1.21)
Top5AbRet -0.00509 -0.00550 -0.00550 -0.00559 -0.00575
(-1.01) 0-.01) (-1.01) (-1.03) (-1.06)
Bot5AbRet 0.00493 0.00733 0.00725 0.00635 0.00643
(0.62) (0.87) (0.87) (0.75) (0.76)
Constant 0.000625 0.00763 0.00818 0.00956 0.0101
(0.03) (0.42) (0.46) (0.52) (0.55)
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 44,592 44,592 44,592 44,592 44,592
Adi R2 0.190 0.165 0.174 0.148 0.153
t-statistics in parentheses; Ip < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Errors are clustered by company.
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TABLE 8. PANEL C: REGRESSIONS: MAJORITY "WITHHOLD"-VOTE
OUTCOMES, FIRM-FIXED EFFECTS, EARLY AND LATE ADOPTERS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Whvote50 Whvote50 Whvote50 Whvote50 Whvote50
EarlyMVR -0.00153 -0.003171 .0.00358* -0.00337 -0.00342+
(-0.88) (-1.86) (-2.15) (-1.85) (-1.82)
LateMVR -0.00243 -0.00474* -0.00468* -0.00445* -
0.00446*
(-1.30) (-2.24) (-2.22) (-2.00) (-2.09)
ISS WE Rec 0.0698**
(7.92)
EarlyMVR x ISS WH -0.0690**
Rec (-7.96)
LateMVR x ISS WH Rec -0.0496**
(-3.38)
Attendless75
EarlyMVR x
Attendless75
LateMVR x
Attendless75
Attendless75 x ISS WH
Rec
EarlyMVR x
Attendless75 x ISS WH
Ree
LateMVR x
Attendless75 x ISS WH
Rec
Failure to Implement
EarlyMVR x Failure to
Implement
LateMVR x Failure to
Implement
Failure to Implement x
ISS WH Rec
EarlyMVR x Failure to
Implement x ISS WH
Rec
LateMVR x Failure to
Implement x ISS WH
Rec
Insthold
Top5AbComp
ln(Mktcap)
SDret
0.140**
(4.84)
-0.140**
(-4.85)
-0.450
(-0.48)
0.204**
(5.05)
-0.203**
(-5.02)
0.0539
(0.24)
0.0344*
(2.27)
-0.0337*
(-2.24)
-0.00937
(-0.49)
-0.00393
(-0.39)
0.00332
(0.99)
0.000427
(0.23)
-0.137
(-1.55)
-0.00594
(-0.55)
0.00158
(0.54)
0.000240
(0.13)
-0.115
(-1.34)
-0.00629
(-0.58)
0.00197
(0.68)
0.000238
(0.13)
-0.114
(-1.34)
-0.00608
(-0.55)
0.00172
(0.55)
-0.0000376
(-0.02)
-0.114
(-1.29)
0.0959**
(2.87)
0.0931**
(-2.81)
0.0937
(0.49)
-0.00621
(-0.57)
0.00201
(0.59)
0.000241
(-0.13)
-0.103
(-1.19)
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TABLE 8. PANEL C, CONTINUED
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Whvote50 Whvote5O Whvote5O Whvote50 Whvote50
Top5AbRet -0.00506 -0.00549 -0.00554 -0.00564 -0.00551
(-1.01) (-1.01) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-1.01)
Bot5AbRet 0.00495 0.00736 0.00735 0.00628 0.00635
(0.62) (0.88) (0.88) (0.75) (0.75)
Constant 0.000401 0.00714 0.00752 0.00986 0.0112
(0.02) (0.40) (0.42) (0.54) (0.60)
Year-Fixed Effects
Firm-Fixed Effects
N
Adi R2
Yes
Yes
44,592
0.190
Yes
Yes
44,592
0.165
Yes
Yes
44,592
0.175
Yes
Yes
44,592
0.148
Yes
Yes
44,592
0.153
t-statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Errors are clustered by company.
Consistent with our predictions, the coefficient for MVR is
significantly negative in four of the five regressions and the coef-
ficient for the primary-conduct variable is significantly positive in
each of the five regressions in Panel B of Table 8. In four regres-
sions, the coefficient for the interaction variable between one of
the offenses and MVR is significantly negative. Thus, even after
controlling for endogeneity through firm-fixed effects, given sim-
ilar conduct, MVR companies have a lower likelihood of receiving
a majority "withhold" vote than do PVR companies.
For each model in Panel B, we split the MVR variable into
one for early adopters (EarlyMVR) and one for late adopters
(LateMVR). We report the results in Panel C of Table 8. The in-
teraction terms for the early adopters are statistically significant
in all five regressions. Moreover, the sum of the "offense" variable
and the interaction term between the "offense" variable and Ear-
lyMVR is close to zero for each model, indicating that the negative
effects of the offense on director voting are largely eliminated for
the early adopters. Evidence for the electioneering or shareholder-
restraint hypotheses therefore xists for the early adopters. For
late adopters, however, only the interaction coefficient for the ISS
"withhold" recommendation is significant.
The results in Table 8 could in principle reflect gradations in
offensive conduct that are not captured by our variables. Thus, for
example, the conduct of directors of plurality voting firms who re-
ceive ISS "withhold" recommendations may be systematically
worse than the conduct of directors of majority voting firms who
receive ISS "withhold" recommendations. While this may be plau-
sible for some of our conduct measures, we think it is unlikely
with respect to conduct defined as "failure to attend at least 75
2016] Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?
percent of meetings and ISS 'withhold' recommendation" (Attend-
less75 X ISS WH Rec) and "failure to implement and ISS 'with-
hold' recommendation" (Failure to Implement x ISS WH Rec).
Moreover, the coefficient estimates for the interaction varia-
ble for early adopters are virtually identical to (and of the opposite
sign as) the estimates for the respective-conduct variable. Thus,
for example, in Model 3 of Panel C, the coefficient estimate for
"failure to attend at least 75 percent of meetings and ISS 'with-
hold' recommendation" (Attendless75 x ISS WH Rec) is 0.204, in-
dicating a 20.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood that a
director at a plurality voting firm that engaged in such conduct
would receive a majority "withhold" vote. The coefficient estimate
for "failure to attend at least 75 percent of meetings and ISS 'with-
hold' recommendation" (Attendless75 x ISS WH Rec) interacted
with early adopter (EarlyMVR) is -0.203, indicating a 20.3 per-
centage point decrease in the likelihood for a director at an early-
adopting majority voting firm relative to a plurality voting firm.
We are dubious that discrepancies of this magnitude can be ex-
plained by gradations in offensiveness within the group of direc-
tors who failed to attend at least 75 percent of meetings and also
received an ISS "withhold" recommendation.
In sum, the results in Table 8 present strong evidence of elec-
tioneering or shareholder restraint for early adopters, although
we are unable, on the basis of this test, to distinguish between the
two hypotheses. By contrast, there is only weak evidence that
electioneering or shareholder restraint affect the voting pattern
for late adopters.
CONCLUSION
Director nominees at companies that adopt majority voting
are far less likely to receive high levels of votes against them than
are directors at plurality voting companies. The challenge is to
explain why. Is it because firms likely to receive high levels of
"withhold" votes are less likely to adopt majority voting, or does
the adoption of majority voting cause a firm to become less likely
to receive high levels of "withhold" votes? And if the latter, is the
causal effect due to directors taking fewer actions likely to offend
shareholder sensibilities, due to companies campaigning harder
to reduce the level of "withhold" votes, or due to shareholders be-
coming more reluctant to withhold their vote because they antic-
ipate that voting against a director nominee is not a mere protest
vote but may have real consequences?
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In our analysis, we obtain different results for early and late
adopters of majority voting, in both the reasons for and the effects
of adoption. For early adopters, we find evidence of selection ef-
fects: these companies had more electoral success and more
shareholder-oriented governance before they adopted majority
voting than firms that did not adopt majority voting. We conclude
that early adopters largely adopted majority voting voluntarily.
By contrast, we do not find statistically significant evidence that
late adopters differ from nonadopters.
For both early and late adopters, we find statistically signifi-
cant evidence that the adoption of majority voting affected voting
results subsequent o the switch to majority voting. The reasons
for this effect may differ, however, for these two sets of firms. For
late adopters, we conclude that adoption of majority voting led to
more shareholder-friendly governance, either because of the
heightened threat that a majority "withhold" vote would lead to
ouster from the board or because the adoption of majority voting
made boards more sensitive to shareholder concerns. We find lit-
tle evidence that late adopters enhanced their electoral fortunes
through electioneering or that they benefited from shareholders'
restraint.
For early adopters, by contrast, we find evidence consistent
with either electioneering or shareholder estraint. Outside of the
specific context of inducing directors to attend sufficient board
and committee meetings to meet the 75 percent attendance
threshold, however, it is unclear whether adoption of majority
voting had much effect on director behavior for early adopters.
The difference in our results for early and late adopters has
broader lessons for understanding the spread of corporate govern-
ance innovations. In principle, there are two plausible strategies
that shareholders can use to select targets for governance reform.
The first is to target companies that are most in need of govern-
ance reform, at which the reform will have the most impact and
the company is arguably least able to resist. The second strategy
is to target companies that already have the most shareholder-
friendly governance, at which, although the reform will have the
least impact, the company is most amenable to adopting the in-
novation (either because it is committed to shareholder-friendly
governance or because it realizes that the innovation will make
little difference). Once the innovation has become established at
shareholder-friendly companies, shareholders might then proceed
to target those companies that are most in need of the reform, at a
[83:11191174
2016] Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability? 1175
time when these companies are less able to resist because the re-
form is less novel or has even become a governance norm. At least
for the introduction of majority voting, one of the most widely
adopted innovations over the last decade, the results suggest that
shareholders may have pursued the second strategy and been
highly successful.
The implications of this study may apply to the spread of
other governance reforms. Current innovations, for example, in-
clude proxy access and empowering a percentage of shareholders
to call a special meeting.118 As with majority voting, institutional
investors have urged issuers to adopt these changes. It will be
interesting to examine which of the strategies investors pursue to
induce companies to adopt these changes and whether that strat-
egy succeeds.
That governance innovations can spread in different ways
has important implications for the conduct and interpretation of
empirical studies of corporate governance. First, this study high-
lights the importance of segregating early and late adopters of the
innovations, because the reasons for and the effects of adoption
may differ systematically between these groups. Second, one
needs to be cautious in extrapolating results from studies con-
ducted relatively early in the adoption process. Depending on the
strategy employed by shareholders seeking governance reform,
the effect of an innovation may be significantly higher or lower
for early adopters than for subsequent adopters.
118 See, for example, Patrick McGurn and Edward Kamonjoh, The Latest in Govern-
ance Reform - Proxy Access (ISS), archived at http://perma.cc/3ZM5-RZWE (explaining
that "[flrom a near-standing start this season, proxy access has bolted to the lead of the
2015 shareholder proposal race"); Ning Chiu and Richard Sandler, Spotlight on Share-
holder Proposals: Special Meetings (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, July 19, 2011), archived
at http://perma.cc/S634-XBLG (explaining that, as of 2011, "[a]s a result of targeted [share-
holder] activism in the last few years, more than half of the S&P 500 companies now allow
shareholders to call special meetings").
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APPENDIX. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
COMPANY-DIRECTOR-LEVEL VARIABLES
Variable Name Definition
Whvote
WhvoteX
Attendless75
ISS WH Rec
The ratio of "withhold" votes over the
sum of "withhold" votes plus "for" votes
for the director.
Equal to one if Whvote is greater than
or equal to X percent; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the director attended
less than 75 percent of the company's
director meetings according to IRRC,
measured at the time of the annual
meeting; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if ISS gave the director
a "withhold" recommendation; zero
otherwise.
COMPANY-YEAR-LEVEL VARIABLES
Variable Name Definition
MVR
EarlyMVR
LateMVR
Avg ISS WH Rec
Prior 2 Years
Any ISS WH Rec
Prior 2 Years
Equal to one if the company uses an
MVR to elect directors at the time of
the annual meeting; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the company uses an
IVR to elect directors at the time of
the annual meeting and had adopted
MVR by 2009; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the company uses an
MVR to elect directors at the time of
the annual meeting and adopted MVR
after 2009; zero otherwise.
The mean for the prior two years of the
percentage of ISS "withhold" recom-
mendations for director nominees of
the company.
Equal to one if any of the director nom-
inees at a company received an ISS
"withhold" recommendation in the
prior two years; zero otherwise.
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Avg WH Vote Prior 2
Years
High WH Vote Prior
2 Years
Any Director Re-
ceived > X% WH
Vote Prior 2 Years
Delaware
PPill
ClassBd
CumVote
Top5AbRet
Bot5AbRet
The average percentage of "withhold"
votes for all director nominees at the
company for the prior two years.
The highest "withhold" vote for any di-
rector nominee at the company for the
prior two years.
Equal to one if any director nominee at
the company received more than X per-
cent "withhold" votes in an election dur-
ing the prior two years; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the company is incorpo-
rated in Delaware at the time of the
annual meeting; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the company has a poi-
son pill at the time of the annual meet-
ing; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the company has a clas-
sified board at the time of the annual
meeting; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the company uses a cu-
mulative voting regime to elect direc-
tors at the time of the annual meeting;
zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the abnormal return for
the one-year period prior to the annual
meeting for the company is in the top 5
percent of the sample; zero otherwise.
The "abnormal return" is defined as
the difference between the raw one-
year holding period return for the com-
pany and the one-year holding period
return for the CRSP value-weighted
market index.
Equal to one if the abnormal return for
the one-year period prior to the annual
meeting for the company is in the bot-
tom 5 percent of the sample; zero oth-
erwise. The "abnormal return" is de-
fined as the difference between the raw
one-year holding period return for the
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SDret
Mktcap
Insthold
CharterAmend
Failure to
Implement
company and the one-year holding per-
iod return for the CRSP value-
weighted market index.
Standard deviation of raw returns for
the company for one year prior to the
annual meeting.
Market capitalization of the company
in millions of dollars measured on the
last trade date prior to the annual
meeting.
The percentage of outstanding shares
of the company held by institutional in-
vestors as of the end of the March
quarter in the meeting year.
Equal to one if the company is incorpo-
rated in a state that requires a charter
amendment o adopt majority voting to
elect directors; zero otherwise.
Equal to one if the company failed to
implement a shareholder proposal that
received majority support during the
relevant time period; zero otherwise.
For this study, we collected data on
shareholder governance proposals that
received more "for" votes than
"against" votes during the 2007 to 2012
proxy seasons and in which the imple-
mentation of the proposal would have
resulted in an SEC filing. We omitted
proposals to implement majority vot-
ing, because these proposals affect only
firms with plurality voting. We further
omitted "say on pay" proposals for 2009
and subsequent years because federal
"say on pay" legislation was already
pending when these proposals would
have been implemented. When a firm
had multiple shareholder proposals
that received more "for" votes than
"against" votes in a particular proxy
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Top5AbComp
Post-MVR Switch
season, we treated the firm as not im-
plementing a proposal if it failed to im-
plement at least one of the proposals.
Equal to one if the total excess com-
pensation for the CEO of the company
was in the top 5 percent of the sample;
zero otherwise. We define "total excess
CEO compensation" as the difference
between the total CEO compensation
for the year prior to the annual meet-
ing (as provided by the Compustat exe-
cutive compensation database) minus
the expected total CEO compensation.
We calculate the expected total CEO
compensation by first estimating an or-
dinary least squares model as follows
(following a model suggested to us by
Professor Martijn Cremers):
ln(Total CEO Compensation) = a +
01ln(Mktcap) + 2OneYear_
AbnormalHoldingPeriodReturn
+ 30OneYearStandardDev
+ Year Effects + Industry Effects + c
We then use the predicted total CEO
compensation based on this model as
the expected total CEO compensation.
Industry effects were based on two-
digit Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (SIC) codes.
OneYearAbnormalHoldingPer-
iodReturn is defined as the difference
between the holding period return and
the value-weighted CRSP market in-
dex for the same period.
Equal to one for either an MVR
Adopter or match company in the time
period after the MVR Adopter has
switched to MVR; zero otherwise. We
matched firms that adopted majority
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Post-MVR Switch
Early
Post-MVR Switch
Late
voting (MVR Adopter) with plurality
voting companies in the same industry
(measured by a two-digit Standard In-
dustrial Classification (SIC) code). If
there were more potential matches
than MVR-adopting companies in the
industry, we matched based on close-
ness in market capitalization. If there
were more MVIR-adopting companies
than potential matches, we matched
the MVR-adopting firms closest in
market capitalization to potential
matches and eliminated those MVR-
adopting companies without a match.
Equal to one for either an MVR Adopter
Early or match company in the time pe-
riod after the MVR Adopter Early has
switched to MVR; zero otherwise.
Equal to one for either an MVR Adopter
Late or match company in the time per-
iod after the IVR Adopter Late has
switched to MVR; zero otherwise.
COMPANY-LEVEL VARIABLES
Variable Name Definition
MVR Adopter
MVR Adopter Early
MVR Adopter Late
Equal to one if the company eventually
adopted MVR during the time period of
our study; zero otherwise.
Equal to one in all years if the com-
pany adopted MVR at any point up to
2009; zero otherwise.
Equal to one in all years if the com-
pany adopted MVR at any point after
2009 and during the time period of our
study; zero otherwise.
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